University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2012

Patent Law's Audience
Mark D. Janis
Timothy R. Holbrook

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Janis, Mark D. and Holbrook, Timothy R., "Patent Law's Audience" (2012). Minnesota Law Review. 336.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/336

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Patent Law’s Audience
†

Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook

††

Introduction ................................................................................. 73
I. Designing Legal Rules in View of Audience Interests ....... 76
A. Proximity ......................................................................... 77
B. Complexity ...................................................................... 80
C. The Proximity/Complexity Tradeoff .............................. 82
II. Mapping The Modern Patent System: Audience and
The Proximity/Complexity Tradeoff .................................... 84
A. Audience in the Early American Patent System .......... 84
B. Audience in the Modern Patent System:
Unfavorable Proximity for Complex Rules? ................. 86
III. Redesigning Patent Law In View of Audience .................... 89
A. The Proximity/Complexity Problem with Patent
Scope Doctrines ............................................................... 90
1. Claim Construction: The PHOSITA as a
Constructed Audience .............................................. 93
2. Prosecution History Estoppel: The Appearance
(and Disappearance) of the “Reasonable
Competitor” as Audience ........................................ 101
3. Disclosure-Dedication Rule and Other
Specification-Based Doctrines of Surrender ......... 107
4. Patent Disclosure Rules ......................................... 112
5. Audience and Freedom-to-Operate: The
Example of Divided Infringement Claims ............ 116
† Robert A. Lucas Chair of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of
Law; Director, Center for Intellectual Property Research.
†† Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law. Earlier versions of this work were presented at the Distinguished Professor Lecture at the John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL, in
November 2011, the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at DePaul Law
School in August 2011, the Fordham Intellectual Property Colloquium in January 2011, the Intellectual Property Colloquium at the Indiana Maurer School
of Law in January 2010, and a faculty workshop at the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law in April 2009. Copyright © 2012 by Mark D. Janis &
Timothy R. Holbrook.

72

2012]

PATENT LAW’S AUDIENCE

73

B. Proximity and Ex Ante Incentives in Patentability
Doctrines ....................................................................... 120
1. The On-Sale Bar to Patentability ......................... 121
2. The Public-Use Bar to Patentability and the
Experimental-Use Negation .................................. 126
Conclusion .................................................................................. 131
“Of course it would have been better for all concerned . . . if [plaintiff
patent holder] Mr. Lough had read our prior opinions before he be1
came an inventor. . . .”

INTRODUCTION
Who does read patent law? Not Steven Lough, in all likelihood. He was a boat mechanic working at a marina in Sarasota, Florida. After observing that the stern drives of Brunswick inboard/outboard boats frequently failed due to corrosion,
he designed a new seal assembly and built six prototypes using
2
his grandfather’s metal lathe. He installed one of the proto3
types on his own boat and gave the others away. Eventually he
got a patent, and when Brunswick introduced a stern drive
having an allegedly similar seal assembly, Lough sued for infringement. He won a jury verdict, but the Federal Circuit
overturned it on appeal, concluding that Lough’s patent should
have been held invalid because Lough had put the prototypes
into public use more than a year before filing his patent appli4
cation. According to the panel majority, Lough had neglected
to keep adequate documentation that might have helped him
prove that he was merely testing the seal assembly to deter5
mine whether it worked. Of course, as Judge S. Jay Plager
caustically remarked, prior to building the prototypes, Lough
had presumably not mastered the jurisprudence of the experi6
mental use negation of the public use bar to patentability.
1. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Plager, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1115–16.
3. Id. at 1116.
4. Id. at 1122 (invoking 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1124 (Plager, J., dissenting). It still isn’t clear whether the Federal Circuit as a whole had mastered it, either. See Lough v. Brunswick Corp,
103 F.3d 1517, 1517–18 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (order denying rehearing en banc, accompanied by separate opinion of Judge Lourie in support of the order and
four opinions from Judges Newman, Plager, Michel, and Rader, respectively,
dissenting from the order). In any event, Judge Lourie’s opinion for the panel
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In truth, we think it would be only a mild exaggeration to
assert that no one actually reads the patent law in its raw
state. Really, who would? In the nineteenth century, it was not
unusual for popular newspapers or magazines to report at
length on patent decisions, ostensibly for an idealized reader7
ship of ingenious Yankee mechanics or yeoman farmers. Perhaps the notion of the paradigmatic informed citizen inventor
8
was always a caricature, or perhaps times and reading habits
have changed. Regardless, it is at best a fond Jeffersonian conceit to suggest that modern research scientists pass their days
poring through the prodigious output of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—or that they have a clear notion
of who or what the court even is. Moreover, the obvious retort—
that modern patent professionals read the patent law and retransmit the text to their clients—raises additional questions,
and assumes (incorrectly, we think) that patent professionals
actually do get their patent law predominantly from source ma9
terials, rather than from intermediaries.
The fact is that patent law is probably much more remote
from its putative end users than patent law rhetoric conventionally admits. Two types of problems result. First, remoteness
complicates patent law’s ex ante incentives story. In the traditional version of the story, patent law incents inventors’ actual
decisions about whether to work on inventions, or inventors’
10
decisions to disclose them, and patent rulemaking is an exermajority in Lough insisted that “[t]he law does not waive statutory requirements for inventors of lesser sophistication.” Lough, 86 F.3d at 1122.
7. See Mark D. Janis, Daniel Webster ’s Patent Cases 8 (Sept. 25, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (citing press coverage of patent
litigation involving Goodyear’s patent for vulcanized rubber).
8. See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 899, 904 –22 (2002) (alluding to the “heroic inventor” motif of nineteenth
century patent law); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110
MICH. L. REV. 709, 712–14 (2012) (arguing that most inventions are made by
multiple teams working concurrently).
9. There is a parallel set of questions about who (if anyone) actually
reads the text of patent documents. The answers are important for many patent law doctrines, and we think it problematic simply to assume a homogeneous audience of enlightened inventors. Justice Breyer may have indulged in
such an assumption in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012) (“[T]he ‘administering’ step simply refers to the
relevant audience, namely doctors who treat patients with certain diseases
with thiopurine drugs . . . . [T]hese clauses tell the relevant audience about the
[natural] laws while trusting them to use those laws appropriately where they
are relevant to their decisionmaking.”).
10. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024 –30
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cise in intricately sculpting those incentives to create a perfect
fit with the overriding normative and constitutional goal of
11
promoting progress in the useful arts. But that account assumes that the law’s incentives actually are communicated, in
some form, to inventors. If modern patent law is all but incomprehensible to inventors, then who does receive patent law’s
messages about incentives? How are those messages rebroadcast to inventors? How certain are we that the subtleties of patent law’s putative incentive effects are not lost in translation?
Second, patent law’s remoteness presents serious challenges for the design of the patent system’s institutions and rules.
It creates great pressure on the system to develop intermediaries that can function to refine the formal patent law so that its
audience can receive a comprehensible essence. It creates pressure to perfect those intermediaries so as to minimize the
chance that they will introduce translation errors. And it suggests that in elaborating patent law rules, Congress, the courts,
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
need a better understanding of the composition of the intended
audience, and need to understand how and when to invoke the
intermediaries that may connect rule to audience.
In this paper, we argue that the patent law could operate
more effectively if it (1) incorporated a more realistic conception
of its audience, and (2) devised pragmatic mechanisms—
intermediaries—to bridge the distance between formal patent
law rules and the targeted audience for those rules. In Part I,
we synthesize literature pertinent to the general problem of designing law in view of the relevant audience. We identify and
define two considerations that guide this design exercise, proximity and complexity, and offer a simple matrix to illustrate the
proximity/complexity tradeoff in the design of rules. In the remainder of the paper, we turn to patent law. In Part II, we conceptualize the patent system as a complex network involving a
multiplicity of speakers, intermediaries, and audiences. Among
other things, we use this network metaphor to show that many
patent rules lack proximity to their putative audience. In light
of that observation, in Part III, we reevaluate specific patent
law doctrines in view of the proximity/complexity tradeoff, of(1989) (explaining the incentive to invent and incentive to disclose theories).
In another incarnation, the patent right encourages investors to fund innovation. Id. at 1036–38.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing that one of the powers of Congress is to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts”).
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fering our own normative choices about how proximity and
complexity might be rebalanced in the design—or redesign—of
particular patent law rules.
I. DESIGNING LEGAL RULES IN VIEW OF AUDIENCE
INTERESTS
Law must communicate to be effective. That proposition is
intuitive; restating it may seem trite. A legal regime (such as
patent law) may be understood as a communication system, one
in which rulemaking institutions broadcast messages, adjudicative institutions interpret and retransmit them to stakeholders, and stakeholders act based on the rules and deliver feed12
back, ultimately to the rulemaking institutions.
This
observation, likewise, is probably trivial. Virtually anything in
modern experience can be conceptualized as information and
situated in a network where information flows from one node to
13
another and is processed, refined, or distorted.
Obvious though it may be, the network metaphor could enrich traditional legal analysis by expanding its perspective.
Traditional legal analysis focuses exquisite attention on designing rules, and, perhaps, on designing institutions to promulgate
and interpret those rules. It has paid far less attention to the
mechanisms by which rules are transmitted—or not—to their
14
ultimate target audiences. Traditional legal analysis at its
12. See Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, Studying Law by Association: Bruno Latour Goes to the Conseil D’Etat, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 805, 806 (2008)
(observing that Latour’s work “treats law as a network of people and of things
in which legality is not a field to be studied independently, but is instead a
way in which the world is assembled”); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A
Map of Misreading: Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. LAW &
SOC. 279, 299 (1987) (characterizing law as a “network of legal orders”); see
also Dan L. Burk, Law as a Network Standard, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 63, 72
(2005) (exploring law’s network effects); infra Part II (applying these concepts
to the patent system).
13. See, e.g., JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A HISTORY, A THEORY, A
FLOOD 8–9 (2011) (“Life spreads by networking.”).
14. For simplicity, we are referring to “audience” as any entity that receives a message, whether directly or indirectly. In doing so, we are taking
some liberties with terminology. Linguists define the “addressee” as the entity
directly receiving the communication and the “audience” as the collective set of
entities for whom the communication is ultimately intended. Drury Stevenson,
To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 116–17 (2003).
Some scholars have found it useful to subdivide the audience even further.
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (2003) (defining auditors, overhearers, and
eavesdroppers).
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most myopic obsesses over nodes, discounting the fact that
those nodes exist in a complex and, perhaps, dynamic networked system that may involve a multitude of participants
who experience the system in dramatically different ways.
Our interest in the audience perspective is pragmatic. We
15
leave for others the larger jurisprudential implications. We
seek a diagnostic tool for identifying design problems in the patent law system and for guiding efforts to address those problems. We suspect that other areas of law may benefit from a
similar treatment, but such extrapolations fall outside the
scope of our work here.
With this goal in mind, we have examined literature apply16
17
ing principles of sociolinguistics, network science, and information theory to law, and we have taken account of more
traditional scholarly endeavors in areas such as property theory, all to develop a conception of the role of audience in the design of legal systems. Based on this study, we have defined two
rudimentary design parameters. We refer to the first as proximity, a measure of the extent to which formal law communicates directly to its putative audience. We call the second complexity, to refer to the extent of information that a formal legal
rule attempts to convey. We can order these parameters in a
simple two-by-two matrix to illustrate how they interact in the
design of any individual legal rule. In this section we explain
our concepts of proximity and complexity, along with the prox18
imity/complexity matrix that frames our analysis.
A. PROXIMITY
Formal law sometimes communicates directly with those
bound by it. Consider, for example, a speed limit sign displayed
on a public road. The rule of law is communicated directly to
15. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 563–65 (1989) (treating legislative rulemaking as a process of communication and asking whether the legislature can engage in audience pre-selection and preparation).
16. See generally Stevenson, supra note 14, at 116–23 (discussing sociolinguistic features of written legal formulas).
17. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of
Networks: An Overview and an Application to the “Patent Explosion,” 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293 (2006) (applying a network science perspective to
patent law).
18. For purposes of this initial discussion we are treating audience as an
empirical fact. Later we discuss the possibility of treating audience prescriptively, as another variable in the design of rules. See infra Part III.
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the relevant audience, car drivers. The legal text is literally
spelled out for the ultimate audience and presented in such a
manner that no specialized expertise is required in order to discover the text. We could characterize such a rule by saying that
there is little distance between the speaker (the state) and the
19
audience (the drivers).
Such direct communication of the law to the relevant audience does not always occur. Often, parties bound by formal legal rules have never read the texts, may not know where to find
them or how to read them if they could find them, and see little
need to do so in any event. In such instances, other mechanisms forge an indirect connection between formal law and its
audience. Background knowledge, norms, or customs may coincide so closely with the formal law that actual recourse to the
formal legal text would be redundant. For example, although
most may not understand the subtle differences between murder and homicide, everyone knows that taking the life of another is a crime, absent some justification such as self-defense. The
failure to read the statute that defines murder does not reduce
the effectiveness of the law in enforcing the proscriptions on
homicide.
Alternatively, formal law may be communicated to its ultimate audience by way of intermediaries. Intermediaries may
be individuals, institutions, or legal constructs. Perhaps the
clearest example is the practicing bar. Lawyers “transmit[] the
law in distilled form to the citizenry. They change the law from
its original form . . . into ‘conduct rules’ addressed to the citi20
zen.” In some areas—such as patent law—the technical precepts of the law may not be rooted in background norms, or
there may simply not be very many of them on which to rely.
Thus, for designing the patent law system, it is critical to develop intermediaries and situate them in such a way as to facilitate efficient dissemination of the formal rules or, as we discuss in more detail in the next section, elaborate legal
constructs to help translate the law.
To capture the notion of a degree of separation between the
entity promulgating a formal legal rule and the audience tar19. Of course, it is also important that the rule at issue is inherently simple. A placard posted outside a lab saying, “Warning—Do Not Infringe Patents” could also be argued to speak directly to its ultimate target audience,
but the message may be too complex for that audience to decode under the circumstances. See infra Part I.B for an explanation.
20. Stevenson, supra note 14, at 147–48 (referring to criminal law).
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geted by that rule, it may be useful to speak of a rule’s proximi21
ty to its audience. A legal rule that is distant from its audience may be subject to additional design constraints as compared to a rule that is proximal to its audience. Indirectly,
proximity may express information about the character of the
audience. We might characterize a rule as being distant from
its audience if the rule attempts to speak directly to the general
public, especially in a context like patent law in which the general public is unlikely to have internalized much background
22
knowledge about the system and its rules and institutions. We
may also speak in institutional terms, of rulemaking institutions that are generally distant from the audiences that they
purport to target, such that the rules promulgated by those institutions will frequently present a proximity problem. For example, bankruptcy law is directed to individuals, yet we do not
realistically expect the general public to know the details of
how bankruptcy works, aside from recognizing that it is an option for those whose debts exceed their assets. The debtor is ultimately quite remote from the law.
Proximity is important in legal regimes that impose legal
obligations ergo omnes. Real property law furnishes a useful illustration of this point, even though our focus in the remainder
23
of the paper is patent law. Property is a form of communica24
tion, as Carol Rose has pointed out. As she puts it,
“[l]anguage, in the broader sense of symbolism and communica25
tion, makes property possible” in that property claimants articulate their claims, and others take notice of those claims and
acquiesce in them. Similarly, Henry Smith has explained that
the efficient operating of property regimes requires that a dif21. A similar measure appearing in the literature of network sciences is
the “closeness” metric. See, e.g., PETER R. MONGE & NOSHIR S. CONTRACTOR,
THEORIES OF COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 38–39 (2003) (using a measure of
“closeness” to evaluate an entity’s ability to access information through a network, where closeness refers to the extent to which the entity is connected, directly or indirectly, to other entities in the network); see also id. at 223–39
(discussing concepts of proximity in theories of social networks).
22. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
23. Criminal law presents another striking example. Vast segments of it
are relevant to everyone’s general daily affairs, and most people substantially
abide by it without ever consulting or comprehending the actual text. Under
one view, instrumentalities of the state serve as intermediaries, bridging the
gap between the text and those bound by it. See Stevenson, supra note 14, at
167.
24. See Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost
of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3 (2006).
25. Id.
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fuse audience understand the communicative message embod26
ied in a claim to property rights. To restate these assertions,
property claims, and the rules that construct those claims, often will not have the benefit of close proximity, because often
those property claims and rules must speak to a diverse audience having no necessary prior relationship with the property
claimant. The problem may be especially acute in intellectual
property, where little in the way of customary practice or other
27
contextual clues are available to guide public behavior.
B. COMPLEXITY
As even the most casual student of the law well knows,
some legal rules are easier to decode than others. Above, we observed that the ease with which this process can occur is, in
part, a function of the proximity of the intended audience to the
institution promulgating the rule. Here, we note that the ease
of decoding should also be a function of the rule’s inherent
complexity.
We regard this as another largely obvious proposition that
borrows elementary insights from information theory. In information-theoretic terms, any networked communication system should take into account the sheer quantity of information

26. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1117–22 (2003) (discussing rules of possession and context needed for the audience to understand them). For example, in
the classic case of Pierson v. Post, adoption of the “reasonable prospect of
catching” rule for possession of the hunted fox requires knowledge of the context of the hunt, in contrast to the clearer, non-contextual rule of “certain control.” Id. at 1117–18.
27. One key contextual clue that intellectual property lacks is tangibility.
While owners of real property—and the rest of us who must abide by the laws
of property on a daily basis—may not know the real difference between a life
estate and a fee simple absolute, we do know that the relevant property rights
are tethered to some “thing”—the land—and there may be abundant physical
signs that corroborate a claim of rights in that thing—say, fences. In contrast,
intellectual property, and patents in particular, do not have such tangibility to
anchor the owner’s instincts or knowledge of the rights and requirements.
Moreover, unlike real property, the scope of a patent’s right to exclude shifts
over time, further complicating the audience’s task of decoding the relevant
rules. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into
After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 493 (2008); Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising”
Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151,
174 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession
Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15–29 (2009).
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contained in a message per unit cost of delivery. For purposes
of applying this idea to legal information, information quantity
may be too crude a concept, given that the information in a legal rule cannot be assumed to be divisible into substituents
that are simply fungible. We prefer to use the label complexity.
A highly complex rule, as we define it, is difficult to decode, but
this presents little concern if the relevant audience is small and
expert. It presents greater concern as the audience becomes
large and more diverse in its abilities and familiarity with the
29
legal regime at issue.
We do not mean to pretend that the concept of complexity
as we have defined it is comprehensive, nor do we intend to invoke theories of complexity that have been applied to explain
30
the evolution of law. We simply mean to suggest that complexity is a handy tool for the immediate task.
Although he does not use the term “complexity,” Henry
Smith’s discussion of the tradeoff between information intensiveness and audience extensiveness helps us illustrate what
31
we mean by rule complexity and its connection with audience.
32
Smith contrasts contract and property. Contract provisions,
Smith asserts, can convey large amounts of information per
unit costs because the audience—the parties to the contract—is
very small, expert, related (by virtue of having negotiated the
33
contract), and fully aware of the relevant context. The parties,
knowing the context, will be able to take more information accurately from fewer words, even if those words are idiosyncrat34
ic. These conditions, the argument goes, do not exist with regards to property claims, and so property rules cannot convey

28. See Smith, supra note 26, at 1110–11 (referring to information intensiveness: the amount of information per unit cost of delineation).
29. We see some connections between our notion of rule complexity and
the debate over rules versus standards. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rules v.
Standards for Patent Law in the Plant Sciences, 24 LAW IN CONTEXT 44, 48–50
(2006) (one of many works showing how the debate may be relevant in intellectual property law).
30. See J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1437–48 (1996) (exploring the relevance of complexity theory).
31. Smith, supra note 26, at 1111.
32. Id. at 1110–11.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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the same information intensity—or complexity, in our lan35
guage.
We agree with this comparison as far as it goes, but we can
extend the contract discussion to show why both complexity
and proximity are important. Suppose that the contract is not a
bilateral, negotiated agreement, but a click-wrap license on a
software product. The audience is no longer (necessarily) small,
expert, related, or immersed in the relevant context. The terms
of the contract may be the same as those in the former example—that is, they may have the same complexity—but the audience is no longer as proximal to the source of the contract
36
provisions. Both proximity and complexity matter in designing the relevant rule.
C. THE PROXIMITY/COMPLEXITY TRADEOFF
Having defined the concepts of proximity and complexity
as we intend to use them here, we now show how, at a general
level, those variables interact in the design of rules. Our central proposal here is simple: in the design of legal rules, there is
a tradeoff between proximity and complexity. Rulemaking exercises that ignore this tradeoff are not likely to produce rules
that operate as intended.

35. See id. Smith goes further, suggesting a contrast between rule formalism and rule contextualism, where formalism signals a condition of low information-carrying capacity and is called for in property, while highly contextualized rules work in contracts. Id. at 1112. See generally Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–9 (2000) (asserting that more
formal systems are needed in order to make property rules accessible). But
formalism carries much extraneous intellectual baggage, and we don’t think it
illuminates our inquiry on balance, although there is an interesting juxtaposition with patent law literature criticizing the Federal Circuit’s reliance on
bright-line rules. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52
AM. L. REV. 771, 773–75 (2003).
36. We can imagine other contingencies. For example, third parties may
be affected by the contract and thus may be part of the relevant audience.
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Figure 1

Figure 1: The figure demonstrates the relationship between rule complexity and speaker-audience proximity.

Our central focus here is on rules that fall into Quadrant
IV—that is, rules that purport to convey highly complex content to a distant (low proximity) audience. Those rules are candidates for redesign. They need either to be restructured to reduce their complexity (moving them towards Quadrant II), or
they need to be keyed to take advantage of intermediaries, or
keyed to invoke other sorts of heuristics, to increase the effec37
tive proximity (moving them towards Quadrant III). As we
will argue below, patent law includes too many Quadrant IV
38
rules.
Our framework is directed to individual rules; it presumes
that any given area of law may include rules that populate different quadrants. For example, in patent law, the USPTO has
promulgated regulations that spell out with considerable specificity the DNA sequence information that a patent applicant
must supply in order to comply with the patent law’s general
disclosure requirements for patent claims directed to isolated
39
genes or other DNA inventions. These regulations are Quadrant III rules in our framework: they are highly technical in
content (and thus may be considered highly complex) but they
37. Or both, which may place them in the domain of Quadrant I.
38. See infra Part III.
39. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801–1.821 (2011).
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are directed to a small circle of biotechnology patent professionals (and so are highly proximal to their intended audience,
with little or no need for comprehensive transmission to a more
diffuse, general audience). Many other patent law rules are
Quadrant IV rules, or are candidates to become Quadrant IV
rules because rulemakers are insufficiently sensitive to proximity and complexity.
II. MAPPING THE MODERN PATENT SYSTEM:
AUDIENCE AND THE PROXIMITY/COMPLEXITY
TRADEOFF
Our ultimate goal is to apply the concept of audience, and
particularly the idea of the proximity/complexity tradeoff, to
the design of patent law rules. The next step towards that goal
is to provide a descriptive account of patent law’s audience. We
find that patent law’s audience is rich, complex, and varied. We
reject the notion that patent law’s audience, as a descriptive
matter, is a select and homogeneous group of sophisticates. We
also reject the notion that patent law’s audience is essentially
passive. Instead, we see patent law’s stakeholders as residing
within a complex network in which stakeholders may receive
information (in the form of legal rules), retransmit it to others,
and/or provide feedback to the institutions responsible for
propagating the rules. We find it convenient to refer to the
rhetoric of networks in rendering this description. The early
American patent system provides a useful contrast to the modern system, so we turn briefly to it before depicting the modern
system.
A. AUDIENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM
Many of the rules of modern patent law, including many
that will persist after the America Invents Act of 2011 comes
into full effect, were developed in the early nineteenth century.
In one standard rendition, now dismissed as mythical, the entire American patent system connected in some way to the persona of Thomas Jefferson: he had (it was said) written the leg40
islation that became America’s first patent act; he examined
the early patent applications (or at least had been authorized to

40. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966) (naming Jefferson as a drafter of the Patent Act of 1790 as well as its “moving spirit”). See
generally Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790).
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do so); and, by all accounts, he was keenly interested in inven41
tion.
While the early American patent system was more than a
mere Jeffersonian soliloquy, the stakeholders were indeed few.
Two judges and a select group of lawyers handled virtually all
42
patent litigation. There was no Patent Office, no formal patent bar, and only a few entrepreneurs whose products were
43
likely to be distributed on a commercial scale. The diagram
below portrays the system: Congress and a small subset of the
judiciary (along with one treatise writer) served as the primary
44
source of rules, and a select group of lawyers and inventors
constituted the audience, although they also provided some
45
feedback. We have not included the general public on the diagram. The general public had a stake in the early patent system—at a minimum, they were bound to respect patent rights,
so infringement rules were relevant to them. But given the limited nature of the industrial economy, few among the general
public would have been engaged in activities that would have
exposed them to large-scale patent infringement liability risks.

41. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7–10 (valorizing Jefferson’s contributions to
the early patent system). But cf. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 955 (2007) (refuting the “Jeffersonian
story” of early patent law); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of
History: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson’s Influence on
the Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195, 217 (1999) (explaining Jefferson’s relatively
modest role in early patent law development).
42. See Janis, supra note 7, at 5–6 (explaining that the jurisdictional organization of the federal courts combined with the “geographic concentration
of manufacturing and technical innovation in New England and the MidAtlantic states” resulted in most of the country’s patent cases being heard by
either Justice Joseph Story or Justice Bushrod Washington).
43. See generally Andrew P. Morriss & Craig A. Nard, Institutional Choice
& Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 149–79 (2011) (discussing the statutory, doctrinal,
and socio-economic evolution of the antebellum patent law system).
44. For clarity, we have identified this group of legal “speakers” together,
as indicated by the dashed oval. We have included one early treatise writer,
Willard Phillips, to make the point that at the time, there was no systematic
practice of reporting cases, so treatise writers played a major role in conveying
information about case decisions. The relevant treatise is WILLARD PHILLIPS,
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS (Boston, Am. Stationers, Co. 1837).
45. In the diagram we use the reverse arrows to indicate feedback. An illustration of the feedback from inventors to legal “speakers” may be found in
Walterscheid, supra note 41, at 207–08 (discussing a petition from an inventor
protesting proposed changes to the Patent Act of 1790 presented before the
House in early 1791).
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In the early patent law landscape that we have depicted,
there was little risk of a proximity problem. Indeed, the characteristics of the early American patent system are reminiscent of
the conditions that network theorists attribute to the so-called
46
“small-world model.” This was the landscape in which some
important patentability rules developed—e.g., rules governing
certain aspects of patentability over the prior art. Those rules
remain in effect today, even though a map of the modern system differs greatly from this one, as we detail in the next section.
B. AUDIENCE IN THE MODERN PATENT SYSTEM: UNFAVORABLE
PROXIMITY FOR COMPLEX RULES?
Most observers would readily agree that the modern American patent system is profoundly different from its nineteenth
47
century predecessor. The difference of greatest salience to the
discussion in this Article is the difference in proximity. Although many of the patent system’s rules still purport to affect
48
directly the investment decisions of inventors, inventors are
no longer as proximate to the formal law or the law-making institutions. Innovators rarely interact directly with the formal
law. Instead, they interact with the law through intermediar46. See, e.g., M.E.J. Newman & D.J. Watts, Scaling and Percolation in the
Small-World Network Model, in THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 310, 310 (Mark Newman et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that in such a
model, most entities are connected by a short path through the network, and
there is high “transitivity,” meaning a high probability that there is a high
likelihood that two entities are connected given their common connection to a
third entity).
47. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 7, at 1 (contrasting the antebellum patent
system and economy with the sophisticated institutions and corporations that
are the hallmarks of the modern patent system).
48. We refer here to investment decisions of many varieties—financial resources, time, efforts, etc.
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ies—and very likely through multiple layers of intermediaries.
The diagram below attempts to illustrate these ideas:

The diagram reflects the growing institutional complexity
of the patent system, a phenomenon that compounds the inherent rule complexity of many individual patent law rules. Many
of the institutional stakeholders have become more internally
49
complicated over time, and their relationships with each other
are likewise increasingly complex. And the diagram barely does
justice to the actual institutional complexity of the system; it is
not comprehensive.
The diagram does offer a view as to the composition of
modern patent law’s audience. It includes, first, the patent bar
and a growing range of bloggers, academics, and journalists, all
of whom receive and retransmit the law. They are particularly
important intermediaries in our depiction of the system. If, as
we suspect, many lawyers receive the law primarily via these
sources rather than by reading the actual opinions (that is, if
we are overly optimistic in drawing a direct line of connection
between the patent bar and the entities that promulgate formal
patent law), then these sources are critical to the transmission
50
of the law. Regardless, for any given rule of patent law, it may
49. For example, the diagram represents the USPTO as a single node, but
in fact the USPTO is a large and complicated organization that must frequently mediate between competing internal interests.
50. Some may argue that we give too prominent a role to patent law academics in this depiction. That may be true, but we are academics and we ask
forgiveness if we have a grandiose view of our own importance in the patent
law landscape. In our depiction, the nodes representing both the patent bar
and bloggers, academics, and journalists have high “betweenness,” meaning
that a large number of paths in the network pass through these nodes. See
generally MONGE & CONTRACTOR, supra note 21, at 38.
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be reasonable to assert that the immediate audience is the audience of expert lawyers and commentators, even though the
rule purports to be keyed directly to the inventor.
The diagram also includes other actors—venture capitalists, corporate management responsible for research and development funding decisions—and the actual system no doubt includes many others, all of whom may well have a role in
filtering and repackaging the law to make it digestible by inventors. We think it incorrect to assume that entities such as
these are not, or should not be, a part of patent law’s target audience. Yet, at least on the surface, patent law rules seem to be
made based on the assumption that the message embedded in
those rules will be delivered without alteration to the ultimate,
less proximate target audience of scientists and engineers.
We recognize that it would be easy to quarrel with the details of the diagram. The entities could be arrayed differently,
some subtracted, others added; the arrows indicating the interconnections could be rearranged. But that quarrel simply highlights our point: the patent system relies heavily on intermediaries, but these intermediaries are not necessarily formalized
or vetted. Moreover, the landscape is dynamic—the picture
changes over time, sometimes quite rapidly. In addition, the institutional actors may differ in identity, and certainly in im51
portance, across different areas of technology.
Our diagram is deliberately incomplete in one respect: it
does not portray the “general public” per se as occupying any
discrete node in the diagram. We hesitate to confine the general public to a single node—the risk is too great of minimizing
the role of the general public as the ultimate stakeholder in the
system, and it may be too difficult to represent with simple arrows the channels through which legal information about patents is transmitted to the general public. As we will point
52
out, however, the design of some patent law rules must take
into account the prospect of the general public as the putative
audience. Indeed, some current patent law rules encounter a
severe proximity problem because they purport to convey proscriptions to the general public. The problem arises in connec-

51. This is another manifestation of the familiar point that patent law is,
or is becoming, technology-specific. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1589–95 (2003).
52. See infra Part III.A.
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tion with a number of patent infringement doctrines, as we dis53
cuss in the next section.
III. REDESIGNING PATENT LAW IN VIEW OF AUDIENCE
Consideration of law’s audience should be an important
tool in designing any formal legal regime. In the patent context,
where concerns of public notice drive much of the doctrine, a
rich inquiry into the appropriate audience for particular patent
rules is critical. The proximity/complexity metric we offer in
this Article provides a straightforward basis for assessing the
efficacy of patent doctrine, one which the courts or Congress
could use in shaping individual patent rules. If the patent system is to operate appropriately, then policymakers should attempt to shift individual patent law rules out of Quadrant IV
by either using a bridging heuristic to reduce the distance between the speaker and the audience or by simplifying the rules
54
to reduce complexity. A considered evaluation of audience,
therefore, provides a useful tool by which lawmakers could reform patent law.
This section highlights certain patent rules that could benefit most from a reassessment under our framework. We begin
with doctrines of patent scope. These rules determine the extent of the patent owner’s right to exclude. These doctrines,
therefore, operate to establish a patent’s intangible “fence,” and
thus directly implicate public notice concerns.
Patent scope doctrines are generally complex, but yet they
purport to speak to the general public. As our framework predicts, such doctrines are problematic; they do not respect the
53. As patents and the patent system become more salient in everyday
life, we can expect to see a broader discourse about the disconnect between the
general public and the institutions of the patent system. Regarding increased
salience, see, for example, Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 487–88 (2004) (“Patented nonparadigmatic goods
such as business methods or sports moves, by contrast, affect a larger number
of observers.”). See also Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 410–11 (2008)
(highlighting the media coverage of a heart disease drug patented for use solely in African Americans); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 579 (2006) (arguing that patents have the potential to imply governmental preferences or disfavor towards some members
of society, particularly in the biotechnology arena); Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing
Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of Intellectual
Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353, 360 (2007) (“The new commodity value of patented race depends on its ultimate relationship to the living, breathing people who identify with particular racial groups.”).
54. See supra Part I.C.
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proximity/complexity tradeoff. We show how the law has attempted to respond: by developing constructed audiences to increase the effective proximity between the rulemaking institutions and the audience. Heuristics such as the hypothetical
person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) and the
“reasonable competitor” attempt to serve in this role, and we
critically evaluate their performance.
We then turn to patentability doctrines. Here, our analysis
is more selective. We focus on longstanding rules of patentability that bar inventors from patent protection based on their
own prior disclosures or sales activities—the so-called statutory
bars to patentability. We show that these rules suffer from a
similar tradeoff problem: they purport to convey subtle incentives (high complexity) directly to inventors (unfavorable or low
proximity). A reassessment of these rules is in order, especially
in view of the passage of new patent legislation, as we explain.
A. THE PROXIMITY/COMPLEXITY PROBLEM WITH PATENT SCOPE
DOCTRINES
Patent scope doctrines suffer from a severe proximity/complexity problem. The proximity aspect of the problem is
so fundamental that it occasions little contemporary comment.
Patents operate in a manner that might be likened to statutes:
all members of the public are subject to the exclusive rights of
patents, regardless of whether they are actually aware of a giv55
en patent. Infringement is a strict liability tort, and ignorance
56
of a patent offers no protection from liability. As such, at least
in theory, every member of the population is a potential infringer, and there is a paramount need to provide notice to the
57
general public of the boundaries of any given patent grant.
The complexity problem is all too familiar to the patent
community. One of the most difficult aspects of patent law is
determining the scope of the right to exclude afforded by the
55 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
56. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., No. 2009–1372, 2012 WL 3764695 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2012)
(per curiam).
57. To be sure, it may seem unlikely that an ordinary citizen would ever
need to worry about the enforceable scope of a patent on, say, laboratory
equipment for conducting large-scale genomics or industrial tools used for oil
drilling. By contrast, patents that cover a customer’s interaction with a commercial website might be pertinent to many of us.
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patent. This complexity is due largely to the fact that a patent’s
exclusionary right is linked to something intangible, the idea of
the invention disclosed in the patent document, rather than
something physical, such as land for real property or an object
for most personal property. Ascertaining the scope of the patent
is crucial to both the owner of the patent and to competitors.
The owner wants to ensure that her patent covers her goods in
the market, and competitors need to assess their freedom to operate in a given market.
While patent scope is inextricably tied to the patent document itself, and particularly a patent’s claims, the reality is
that an assessment of a patent’s right to exclude requires consideration of a rather complex amalgam of doctrines, rules, and
canons. Courts initially assess the scope of a patent by engaging in claim construction, the process of providing definitions to
disputed claim terms. In addition to claim construction, a patentee is entitled to protection against anything viewed as
equivalent to the claimed invention. In fact, as a result of the
doctrine of equivalents, the scope of a patent actually changes
over time, ensnaring later-developed technologies that are nev58
ertheless viewed as equivalent to the original invention. In response to the uncertainty created by the doctrine of equivalents, the courts have created a litany of doctrines that limit
the scope of equivalents. Beyond the construction of the claims
themselves, there are various acts that constitute infringement,
including making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing
59
60
the invention; actively inducing others to infringe; and con61
tributing to the infringement of others. Consequently, assessing patent scope is notoriously difficult, requiring familiari58. See Cotropia, supra note 27, at 176; Holbrook, supra note 27, at 29–30.
For these reasons, while we agree with many of the insights by Clarisa Long,
we reject her notion that courts play little role in determining the bounds of
the exclusive right of a patent. See Long, supra note 53, at 499–500 (“While a
court may interpret the language of the patent after it has been issued, the
nature of the judicial inquiry is not to fine-tune the scope of the patent (or indeed to adjust the scope of the patent after the fact), but to examine the validity of each claim.”). It seems to us that courts do adjust the scope of the patent
after the fact, both indirectly through claim construction and quite directly
under the doctrine of equivalents. We are not as sanguine as Long that resort
to the patent document alone can resolve questions of scope: some facility with
the case law governing claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents, and related doctrines is required.
59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
60. Id. § 271(b).
61. Id. § 271(c).
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ty not only with the disclosure of a given patent, but also with
the various rules and doctrines that determine the extent of a
patent’s exclusive rights.
Commentators have suggested that the uncertainty surrounding the scope of patents and the attendant lack of public
notice are perhaps the most significant problems with patent
62
law. Even though the courts, and the Federal Circuit in particular, have articulated a strong policy preference for certainty
63
in order to effect adequate public notice, uncertainty remains
a key point of contention. Perhaps to its detriment, the Federal
Circuit has focused the bulk of its efforts in this area on ag64
grandizing power over patent scope at the appellate level.
This development, however, has resulted in little doctrinal evolution, especially in the area of claim construction, as we detail
below. Instead, the Federal Circuit has enforced what it views
as correct claim constructions in an inscrutable fashion, pursu65
ant to its de novo review of this issue.
62. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 46–
52 (2008) (arguing that even sophisticated entities have been victims of the
patent scope uncertainty and notice issues); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents,
Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 788 (2011).
63. See, e.g., In re Katz Interactive Call Processing, 639 F.3d 1303, 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (rejecting use of extrinsic evidence as “undermining the public notice
function of patents”); PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355
F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining the “public notice” function as “the
mechanism whereby the public learns which innovations are the subjects of
the claimed invention, and which are in the public domain”); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (“[T]hat reason [for the narrowing amendment] should be discernible
from the prosecution history record, if the public notice function of a patent
and its prosecution history is to have significance.”); Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v.
Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider
extrinsic evidence to rebut Warner-Jenkinson presumption because “the public
notice function of the patent record would be undermined”); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(“The claims give notice both to the examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution, and to the public at large, including potential
competitors, after the patent has issued.”).
64. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–80
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
65. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (refusing to reconsider de novo review);
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(holding that claim construction is reviewed de novo on appeal). But see Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc);
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (en banc) (declining en banc reconsideration of de novo review with several dissents and concurrences).
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Largely lost in this doctrinal debate over claim construction and related infringement doctrines is the audience perspective. We know that claim scope doctrines such as claim
construction strive to provide notice at an extraordinary level of
precision to the “public,” but the court has not accounted for the
fact that its claim scope rules are likely to be recoded and relayed among multiple actors before ever reaching the “public,”
if by that terminology we mean the general public that is technically bound by those scope rules. That is, the court in its
claim scope jurisprudence has insisted on rules of supreme
complexity, directed through a complex network of intermediaries to a distant audience.
The result is a difficult proximity/complexity problem. The
audience perspective is useful not only for identifying the problem, but also for evaluating efforts to resolve it. Our discussions
of individual scope doctrines in this section focus primarily on
judicial efforts to create standards such as the PHOSITA or the
“reasonable competitor” to frame certain claim scope inquiries.
We can reconceptualize these standards as efforts to construct
an audience that is more proximate to the rulemaking institution, and then offer some judgments about whether they have
succeeded.
1. Claim Construction: The PHOSITA as a Constructed
Audience
The set of rules most directly concerned with patent scope
is, of course, the claim construction rules, collectively the primary mechanism by which courts elaborate the appropriate
scope of the patent. Claim construction is central to nearly all
aspects of patent law because it is relevant both in asserting
66
whether a patent claim is invalid and whether it is infringed.
As such, the claims and the accompanying set of legal rules for
construing them are considered central to affording proper public notice in the patent system.
No area of patent law has been the target of more criticism
than the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence. An
entire cottage industry of empirical and theoretical studies of

66. See Retractable, 659 F.3d at 1370 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc) (“Claim construction is the single most important event in the course of a patent litigation. It defines the scope of the
property right being enforced, and is often the difference between infringement and non-infringement, or validity and invalidity.”).
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67

claim construction has developed in the years since the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Markman v. Westview In68
struments Inc. The consistent theme among critics is that
claim construction outcomes are too unpredictable. The Federal
Circuit’s current practice of undertaking plenary review of
claim construction on appeal has generated a regime of complex
legal rules, and some would say that there has been little or no
69
offsetting advancement of the notice function.
For our purposes, a glimpse at some of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction rules suffices to illustrate their complexity. The Federal Circuit has adopted the rule that, in order
to construe a claim, a court must first look to the evidence in
the public record regarding the patent: the claims of the patent,
the specification of the patent, and the record of the application
70
at the USPTO, known as the prosecution history. This subset
71
of evidence has been called the intrinsic evidence. Any other
evidence, such as treatises, dictionaries, expert testimony, or
72
inventor testimony, is deemed to be extrinsic evidence. A
companion rule of claim construction permits a court to consult
extrinsic evidence to educate itself, but forbids the court from
using that evidence to contradict the intrinsic evidence if the

67. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent
Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); Kimberly A.
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in
Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737 (2011); R. Polk Wagner &
Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment
of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004).
68. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
69. See Retractable, 659 F.3d at 1370 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc) (characterizing the claim construction rules as
“ill-defined and inconsistently applied, even by us,” and suggesting that the
rules have led to “frustrating and unpredictable results for both the litigants
and the trial court”).
70. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
71. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
72. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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intrinsic evidence is unambiguous. Additional rules build on
this framework. For example, one rule provides that a claim is
to be given its “ordinary meaning” unless the patentee offers a
unique definition, either explicitly in the specification or implicitly by disavowing subject matter in the specification or the
74
prosecution history. Another rule attempts to mediate between forms of intrinsic evidence, prohibiting a court from importing limitations into the claim from the specification or the
75
prosecution history. In addition to these basic precepts, courts
76
may invoke a multitude of other canons of claim construction.
Under the framework proposed in this Article, the sheer
complexity of these claim construction rules is not necessarily
problematic by itself. However, rule complexity becomes problematic when proximity is also unfavorable, because it produces
the “Quadrant IV” problem that we have previously discussed.
And claim construction rules present a massive proximity problem, because those rules are purportedly directed to the “public,” to whom the rules are to provide “notice.” This is a monumental aspiration. Claims are verbal recitations that are all
but meaningless to the “public,” if by that we mean the general
public. Sitting by designation at the district court level, Judge
Posner offered this trenchant critique of the litigants’ proposed
claim constructions:
[M]any of the proposed claims constructions are not in language intelligible to jurors . . . . There is no point in giving jurors stuff they won’t
understand. The jury (actually juries) will not consist of patent lawyers and computer scientists or engineers unless the parties stipulate
to a “blue ribbon” jury; I would welcome their doing so but am not op77
timistic.

Moreover, to say that claims give meaningful notice to the public is to say that the public not only has a mechanism for discovering the existence of particular claims, but also has the ca73. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19. But see Holbrook, supra note 62, at 819
(arguing that the most appropriate time to consult extrinsic evidence is when
it conflicts with the intrinsic evidence).
74. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (discussing the standard applied by the
court in Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
75. Id. at 1320.
76. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 144 –46 (2005) (cataloging the various canons and presumptions in construing a claim).
77. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-08540 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10,
2012) (Posner, J., sitting by designation) (order regarding claim construction
briefs).
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pacity to comprehend and apply the legal rules of construction
78
needed to decode those claims.
This is a useful insight. The audience perspective provides
a reminder that reforming the law of claim construction need
not, and probably should not, be exclusively about attempts to
combat complexity in claim construction rules. Instead, it
should be about achieving a more favorable proximity/complexity tradeoff. One way to do that is to develop simplifying heuristics that bridge the distance between the rulepromulgating institution and the audience. Essentially, the
goal is to make apparent proximity more favorable while tolerating a certain level of complexity.
It might be argued that the Federal Circuit is already following just such a strategy. Claims are said to be directed to
79
the hypothetical PHOSITA. Framed in terms of the audience
analysis, the PHOSITA may be understood as a legal construct
that bridges the distance between the formal rules of claim
construction and the ultimate general public audience. That is,
the PHOSITA might be visualized as a node on the network diagram of the modern patent system shown in the preceding
section, albeit a hypothetical and amorphous one.
The analytic move to conjure up a PHOSITA heuristic coincides with the types of methodologies that our audience analysis advocates. But we have many reservations about the Federal Circuit’s deployment of the PHOSITA heuristic in the
context of claim construction. First, our analysis contemplates
that a heuristic such as the PHOSITA will be used instrumentally to solve a serious proximity problem—not merely recited
by rote as a default objective standard. To work well in the context of our analysis, the PHOSITA construct would need to be
80
given real content, contextualized on a case-by-case basis.
78. Real property boundaries may present analogous problems, but they
are likely to be far less severe. Real property boundaries may be demarcated
by physical barriers or other indicia that instantly convey a claim of exclusivity to the public, and even where they are not, social norms may serve as a reliable substitute.
79. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (“We have made clear, moreover, that
the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time
of the invention . . . .”).
80. For discussions about the PHOSITA construct and ways of improving
it, see Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s
PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227 (2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person
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Elaborating the qualities of the PHOSITA would need to be a
central element of a claim construction analysis, rather than a
throw-off point. We see little of that in the existing case law.
Instead, the Federal Circuit frequently seems to ascribe little
value to the perspective of the PHOSITA in claim construc81
tion.
Second, the case law causes us to question whether the
PHOSITA construct is sufficiently durable for improving proximity in the law of claim construction. The Federal Circuit relies on the PHOSITA construct most heavily (at least in claim
construction) when invoking its “customary and ordinary meaning” rule: that is, the court will seek to determine the customary and ordinary meaning of the claim language as perceived by
82
the PHOSITA. But the Federal Circuit has carved out a key
exception—patent applicants are free to be their own lexicogra83
phers, affording unique definitions to the terms in the claims.
The exception can be triggered in either of two ways: when the
patentee acts as her own lexicographer and offers an express
definition of a term, or when the patentee unmistakably disavows subject matter through narrowing language and argu84
ments in the specification or prosecution history. Effectively,
the proposition here is that a PHOSITA knows that under
these two special circumstances, the patentee’s language in the
specification or the prosecution history trumps the customary
meaning.
This is a great deal to ask of a heuristic device, as is evident from claim construction cases that focus on implicit “disavowal” or other closely-related cases that debate the propriety
of reading language from the specification or prosecution history into the claims. These latter cases in particular have recently demonstrated the fragility of the Federal Circuit’s current
approach to the process of claim construction. In Retractable
Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., the majority limHaving Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77
WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002); John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous
and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37,
37–38 (1991).
81 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185–202 (2002) (discussing flexibility and misapplication of the PHOSITA construct by the courts).
82. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
83. Id. at 1316.
84. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–
66 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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ited the claim term “body” to having only one piece, excluding a
85
multiple-piece structure. Writing for the majority, Judge Alan
D. Lourie suggested the goal for claim construction is “to capture the scope of the actual invention, rather than strictly limit
the scope of claims to disclosed embodiments or allow the claim
language to become divorced from what the specification con86
veys is the invention.” Dissenting, Chief Judge Randall R.
Rader noted that the claim language should be given primacy
and, as that language was silent as to the number of pieces, it
87
should be read to cover a multi-bodied device. The Federal
Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, but Judge Kimberly
A. Moore offered a forceful dissent, recognizing the split in the
court about the appropriate role of the specification in inter88
preting patent claims. It is not clear to us that resort even to a
better-elaborated PHOSITA would resolve this split. An engineer or scientist could offer little insight into this linguistic colloquy of whether the specification narrowed the legal scope of
the claim, rendering resort to a fully-fleshed PHOSITA unhelpful. The use of the specification in an estoppel-like surrender
derives from legal line drawing and analysis, not from the
85. 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
86. Id. Judge Lourie previously advocated such a role for the specification
in Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1257–58
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
bottom line of claim construction should be that the claims should not mean
more than what the specification indicates, in one way or another, the inventors invented.”).
87. Retractable, 653 F.3d at 1312.
88. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“Retractable illustrates a fundamental split within the court as
to the meaning of Phillips and Markman as well as the proper approach to
claim interpretation. I would grant en banc review of Retractable to resolve
the clear intra-circuit split on the claim construction process.”). Judge Plager
recently attempted to reconcile these seemingly diverging views, noting that
they are “complementary,” not antithetical. MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp.,
672 F.3d 1250, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is an over-simplification to suggest
that these are competing theories; rather, they are complementary.”). Judge
Moore, along with Judge O’Malley, would also revisit the current de novo
standard of review for claim construction. Retractable, 659 F.3d at 1373
(Moore, J., dissenting) (“I would also grant en banc review in Retractable to
consider whether deference should be given to the district court’s claim construction.”); id. at 1374 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“It is time to revisit and reverse our decision in Cybor Corp.
v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).”). The Supreme
Court, as of this writing, has asked for the Solicitor General’s views on the
case. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 11-1154, 2012
WL 2470092 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
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technical aspects of the invention. No matter how fleshed out
the PHOSITA is, her views as a technologist simply will not inform what is essentially a legal analysis.
Third, the claim construction cases illustrate how truly hypothetical the PHOSITA is. Real inventors generally do not
concern themselves with language of surrender and disavowal;
these linguistic gymnastics are more in the nature of legal argumentation than a scientifically-driven assessment of the pa90
tent’s disclosure. In addition to the examples already cited,
one might consider the manner in which the Federal Circuit
uses the prosecution history to inform claim construction. The
91
prosecution disclaimer doctrine uses the patentee’s representations at the USPTO against her to narrow the literal scope of
the claim. The justification for this policy is to “promote[] the
public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protect[] the
public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecu92
tion.” This presents the same sort of proximity problem that
we have been discussing, but it is not clear to us that merely
invoking the PHOSITA in place of the general public, and asserting that it is the PHOSITA who would be parsing the prosecution record for disclaimers, is a defensible way forward. After all, the court is considering the legal consequence of
representations made during the prosecution process. The immediate audience for such an assessment is the audience of patent law sophisticates. It seems to us a stretch to hypothesize a
PHOSITA that is both conversant in such an assessment and is
simultaneously a reasonable surrogate for the general public
audience.
All of this may boil down to the conclusion that, while we
need a bridging heuristic for claim construction to deal with the
proximity problem, the PHOSITA heuristic in its current incarnation may not be up to the task. John Golden has arrived
at a similar conclusion. Golden suggests that claims be inter89. See Holbrook, supra note 76, at 139–44 (discussing the evolution of
estoppel-like uses of the specification).
90. See Holbrook, supra note 62, at 791.
91. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2003). For a summary of the evolution of this rule from cases dealing with
equivalency under 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 6, to a rule of general applicability, see Holbrook, supra note 76, at 134 –39.
92. Omega, 334 F.3d at 1324. For a critique on the use of prosecution histories to assess patent scope, see John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and
Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim
Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 200–16 (1999).
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preted from the perspective of the “interpretive community,”
which he defines as “the community of people for whom understanding patent claims is an important and regular enter93
prise.” That is, in his view, the claims’ “primary audience is
united more by commercial interest and legal duty than by
technological expertise. A mixture of businesspersons, lawyers,
USPTO examiners, and judges, this audience consists largely of
individuals who lack an artisan’s skill in the relevant techno94
logical art.” Such community members have a realistic exposure to infringement liability or general interest in avoiding in95
fringement liability. And, of course, these actors, in contrast
to the general public, are likely to be more proximate to the
courts. Thus, the audience analysis that we are advocating here
places Golden’s suggestion in a broader theoretical frame. His
suggestion can be understood as a design strategy reflecting
another set of normative choices about the relevant audience
and the best way to deal with the complexity/proximity
tradeoff.
In sum, reassessing the claim construction process in
terms of the framework advocated here persuades us that, at a
minimum, the Federal Circuit must dispense with the conceit
that claim construction doctrine effectuates precise notice to
the general public. The PHOSITA construct potentially could
be a helpful intermediary between the court and the general
public, but at present it remains too underdeveloped to effect
that objective. In the interim, it would be better for the court to
admit that its claim construction rules are for a limited group
of sophisticates. The Golden methodology provides a laudable
step in this direction by recognizing that the members of the
“interpretive community” are those that have some facility both
with the relevant technology of a patent and with the doctrines
dealing with claim construction. These actors then can translate these rules and constructions to the lay audience, their clients. We believe, however, that there are open questions about
the extent to which that limited group can successfully convey
the legal rules and their consequences to the general public or
even to their immediate audience of business interests.
93. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 321, 331 (2008).
94. Id. at 334.
95. Clarisa Long has dubbed such persons “avoiders”—they have no interest in the actual invention or patent but merely want to avoid infringing it.
Long, supra note 53, at 491.
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2. Prosecution History Estoppel: The Appearance (and
Disappearance) of the “Reasonable Competitor” as Audience
Patents cover not only what they literally claim but also
devices or processes that are equivalent to the claimed invention. The determination of what is “close enough” to be an
equivalent is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that is not a “pris96
oner to formula.” The policy underlying the doctrine is to
avoid strict literalism that would permit others to avoid the pa97
tent easily by making trivial changes to the device. The doctrine of equivalents therefore avoids potential arbitrage of a patent that a strictly literalist approach could encourage, and also
prevents potential, inappropriate obsolescence of the claimed
98
invention. Because equivalency can create fuzziness around
the boundaries of a patent, the courts have offered a variety of
doctrines designed to enhance certainty and predictability regarding the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of prosecution
99
history estoppel is perhaps the premier limit.

96. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950). The courts have articulated at least three tests to assess whether elements in an accused device are equivalent. For example, the Federal Circuit
has used the function-way-result test, which requires that the element in the
accused device “performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result” to be equivalent. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit has
also offered the “insubstantial differences” test. See Lighting World, Inc. v.
Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (“[T]he insubstantial differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might
render any given difference ‘insubstantial.’”). Finally, courts have also considered whether the asserted equivalent was known to be interchangeable with
the relevant claim limitation. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 (“An important factor [in determining equivalents] is whether persons reasonably
skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient
not contained in the patent with one that was.”).
97. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
731–32 (2002) (“If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their
value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes
for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could
be destroyed by simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most efficient rule.”); Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607 (“[T]o permit
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail
would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”).
98. See Cotropia, supra note 27, at 174.
99. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 734 (“Prosecution history estoppel ensures that
the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose.”).
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The basic idea behind prosecution history estoppel is that a
patent owner should not be allowed to reclaim through the doctrine of equivalents subject matter that she gave up during the
100
prosecution of the patent. For example, consider a claim to a
process that originally contains no limitation as to the pH
range at which the process runs. If the claim is then amended
to require that the process be run at a pH of 6.0–9.0, then the
literal scope of the claim would no longer encompass a process
running at a pH of 5.0. The patentee would be expected to argue that a pH of 5.0 is equivalent to a pH of 6.0–9.0 in the context of the claimed process, and the alleged infringer would be
expected to counter by invoking the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, arguing that the patentee should be estopped
from making an assertion of equivalency on the grounds that
the patentee is merely attempting to recapture subject matter
101
that was surrendered during prosecution. The estoppel argument would presumptively prevail on these facts, but the
presumption of estoppel is rebuttable, according to the framework established in the Supreme Court’s Festo decision and
102
elaborated in many Federal Circuit decisions since then. A
patentee may yet avail herself of the doctrine of equivalents if
the narrowing claim amendment giving rise to the alleged surrender bore only a tangential relationship to the asserted
equivalent, or if the asserted equivalent was unforeseeable at
103
the time of the amendment. In turn, additional rules regulate
the types of evidence that may be used to support these respec104
tive rebuttal arguments. As a whole, the post-Festo law of
prosecution history estoppel depends upon a multi-level regime
of legal rules rather than broadly-demarcated zones of equita100. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 190 F.3d 1335, 1341–42
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that an amendment limiting the claim to two specific
polymers resulted in estoppel as to other polymers in the “water soluble”
group, which the accused device used).
101. This example mirrors the situation in Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at
21–23.
102. Festo, 535 U.S. at 741; see, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d
1369, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that the presumption of estoppel is
rebuttable in this “post-Festo era”).
103. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740–41. The rationale for permitting rebuttal in
these circumstances is that one cannot say that the patentee genuinely surrendered the asserted equivalent. As to the former, the patentee presumably
did not contemplate the equivalent when amending the claim; as to the latter,
the patentee could not have volitionally surrendered the equivalent because it
did not yet exist. The Court has also left open the possibility that “other reasons” could serve as a basis for rebuttal. Id.
104. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
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ble discretion. It is probably fair to say that prosecution history
estoppel now has a greater degree of rule complexity. There is
no question that it is more rule-bound.
Accordingly, it would be useful to consider how (or if) prosecution history estoppel’s new rule complexity trades off
against its proximity. Unfortunately, the court’s jurisprudence
gives little indication that the court has developed any coherent
notion of the appropriate audience for prosecution history estoppel rules, much less any deliberate calculation about proximity.
Some of the older, pre-Festo Federal Circuit prosecution
history estoppel decisions displayed at least some marginal
sensitivity to the question of audience. In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that whether prosecution history estoppel applies is determined from the perspective of the “reasonable
105
competitor.” In our framework, this apparent departure from
the default PHOSITA heuristic is significant: it could signal a
determination that statements in a prosecution history, and the
rules that specify whether those statements will negate equivalents, are designed for a (hypothetical) audience that is more
expert and more proximate than the PHOSITA. Or, to reframe
the argument in normative terms, the adoption of a reasonable
competitor standard might result from an instrumental determination that prosecution history estoppel rules ought to be designed to speak to an expert audience, but need not attempt to
put the general public on notice.
However, the court’s rhetoric around the reasonable competitor standard in prosecution history estoppel cases has not
evidenced this sort of deliberation. Instead, the court has expended more effort apologizing for the reasonable competitor
standard than it has spent explaining it. In Hoganas AB v.
Dresser Industries, Inc., the court muddied any distinctions between the PHOSITA and the reasonable competitor:
Ordinarily, the test for determining the meaning of a claim term is
from the vantage point of one skilled in the art. This test would seem
equally appropriate for determining what subject matter was relinquished in the context of prosecution history estoppel. Our precedent
dealing with this specific question recites that the test is measured
from the vantage point of a reasonable competitor. We do not see the105. See, e.g., Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d
801, 813 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The relevant inquiry is whether a competitor would
reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject
matter.”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (same); see also Golden, supra note 93, at 371.
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se formulations as necessarily inconsistent—the point is the
knowledge of one reasonably skilled in the art who views the question
106
from the perspective of a competitor in the marketplace.

Similarly, the court in Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. noted “[i]t is, after all, a competitor who
is desirous of ascertaining the scope of the claims, but it is one
skilled in the art who is best able to understand them. Nonetheless, the standard is the reasonable competitor stand107
ard . . . .”
The court’s ambivalent embrace of the reasonable competitor pre-Festo has not set the stage for an enhanced commitment
after Festo. Instead, the reasonable competitor rhetoric has vir108
tually disappeared. This is especially problematic because the
course of prosecution history estoppel law has made delineation
of the audience all the more relevant.
We see this most clearly in the fine-grained rules that have
developed around two of the rebuttal arguments—the “tangential relationship” argument and the “unforeseeability” argument. The “tangential relationship” requires a legal assessment
of what was the prior art, how did the amendment distinguish
the prior art, and whether the accused device relates to that
109
basis for distinguishing the prior art. The Federal Circuit has
ruled that this inquiry is limited to consideration of the intrinsic evidence alone; resort to extrinsic evidence such as expert
110
testimony is not permitted. As the Federal Circuit explained,
the “reason should be discernible from the prosecution history
record, if the public notice function of a patent and its prosecu111
tion history is to have significance.” Given that only intrinsic,
publicly available information is relevant to the inquiry, the
Federal Circuit has noted that the “tangential relationship” re106. 9 F.3d 948, 952 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
107. 170 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
108. A search on Westlaw for the term “reasonable competitor” post-Festo
yielded only one result, and the term “reasonable competitor” was not used in
the body of the opinion but instead in a parenthetical quotation from a previous case. See Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1340–
41 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc.,
172 F.3d 817, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
109. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 517
F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Primos, Inc. v. Hunter's Specialties, Inc., 451
F.3d 841, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423
F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting,
Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
110. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d
1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
111. Id.

2012]

105

PATENT LAW’S AUDIENCE
112

buttal is purely legal and reviewed de novo on appeal. This
exploration of the reasons for the amendment and its relationship to the asserted equivalent is not technologically driven; instead, it amounts to a legal conclusion as to whether claim
scope should be precluded. Notwithstanding the reference to
the “public” notice function, these rules belong almost exclusively to the domain of lawyers; they speak predominantly to
patent sophisticates, and only provide notice to the general
public indirectly, at best. In the terminology that we are using,
we can probably assume favorable (close) proximity, and therefore we can tolerate relatively high rule complexity. Consistent
with this position, the court might adopt an appropriate heuristic (the reasonable patent lawyer? the reasonable competi113
tor?).
Unfortunately, the same analysis is not likely to apply to
the “unforeseeability” rebuttal argument. The question of
whether an asserted equivalent was unforeseeable at the time
of the amendment is rooted in a factual, technological inquiry.
The Federal Circuit has held that it is appropriate, and likely
necessary, to consider extrinsic evidence in this context and
that, because fact-finding will be involved, the court may need
114
to defer to those findings on appeal. The court reasoned:
By its very nature, objective unforeseeability depends on underlying
factual issues relating to, for example, the state of the art and the understanding of a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art at the
112. See id. at 1370.
113. Argument-based prosecution history estoppel may be subject to a similar analysis. Prosecution history estoppel is not limited to situations in which
the applicant amends the claim. It can also arise when, through arguments
made to the USPTO, the patent applicant unmistakably disclaims claim scope.
This argument-based estoppel operates identically to the prosecution disclaimer rule used in claim construction but, instead of limiting the literal
scope of the claim, it limits the range of equivalents available under the doctrine of equivalents. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314,
1326 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We note that [the prosecution disclaimer standard]
is the same standard applicable, in the context of the doctrine of equivalents,
to the doctrine of argument-based estoppel and that our precedent has recognized a relation between the doctrines of argument-based estoppel and prosecution disclaimer.”). The doctrines are so similar that in no case has the Federal Circuit found the disclaimer to apply in claim construction but then
concluded that argument-based prosecution history estoppel did not apply.
The court itself has recognized that the standards are the same. Id. The idea
of “surrender” in this context is directed to the legal consequences of arguments made in front of the USPTO, not technically-based historical facts. Argument-based estoppel therefore operates in a manner akin to the “tangential
relationship” rebuttal of amendment-based prosecution history estoppel.
114. See Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369.
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time of the amendment. Therefore, in determining whether an alleged
equivalent would have been unforeseeable, a district court may hear
expert testimony and consider other extrinsic evidence relating to the
115
relevant factual inquiries.

Indeed, the “unforeseeability” rebuttal argument seems to rest
on the premise that the prosecution history will convey some
message directly to a technologist, who will call upon his or her
expertise to render an essentially technical judgment about
116
foreseeability and pattern his or her behavior accordingly. If
this is so, then the court’s jurisprudence must account for this
more distant audience by reducing the complexity of the pertinent rules or by invoking robust heuristics that make the apparent proximity more favorable.
Perhaps the dilemma that we have described is simple
enough to resolve: the court can simply adopt different heuristics for the different rebuttal arguments, explicitly recognizing
that the rules are designed for consumption by different audi117
ences. That would be a worthwhile interim improvement, but
we think it highlights a deeper problem with the design of the
prosecution history estoppel doctrine. Doctrines that are based
on more familiar forms of equitable estoppel usually require a
showing of reliance, and generally have arrived at a clear con118
sensus about who the putative reliant party is. Other forms
115. Id.
116. Arguably the Federal Circuit has larded this essentially technological
judgment with yet more complex legal rules as to foreseeability: an equivalent
is foreseeable if it existed at the time of the application even if no one would
have recognized the work as of the date of the application. If the rationale for
the “foreseeability” approach is that the patentee could have, and should have,
filed an application that covers foreseeable equivalents, then this test undermines that policy objective because, absent such knowledge, the patentee
would not have been able to claim the asserted equivalent because she would
not be able to provide an enabling disclosure. See Holbrook, supra note 27, at
23–26 (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s foreseeability analysis).
117. We portray this as simple, but in fact, the court has done virtually
nothing to date to give content to the heuristics that it has (occasionally) invoked. This problem has been especially acute with regards to the “reasonable
competitor.” At a minimum, it seems that the hypothetical reasonable competitor has some facility with patent law. The court explained that “[t]he determination of whether an amendment was made for purposes of patentability on
grounds of obviousness is adjudged from the viewpoint of a person of skill in
the field of the invention, and when the issue includes consideration of formalities of patent practice, experience in patent law and procedures is presumed.”
Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 190 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
118. See, e.g., City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148,
155 (5th Cir. 2010) (promissory estoppel requires detrimental reliance);
Goodenberger v. Ellis, 343 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Tex. App. 2011) (easement by estoppel requires reliance).
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of estoppel—such as judicial estoppel—may not expressly require reliance, but may presume it away in the interest of pre119
serving the integrity of the tribunal. There are arguments
that would map prosecution history estoppel to these tradition120
al forms of estoppel, but they all make assumptions about
audience. We could say that the general public presumptively
relies on any statement that an applicant makes during prose121
cution, or we could say that, as in judicial estoppel, the examiner is presumed to have relied on any such statement. Unfortunately, the court has not engaged in this discussion about
prosecution history estoppel. We suspect that prosecution history estoppel jurisprudence will remain conceptually thin until
that discussion proceeds.
3. Disclosure-Dedication Rule and Other Specification-Based
Doctrines of Surrender
The public dedication rule is another patent scope doctrine
that might benefit from closer scrutiny of the complexity/proximity tradeoff. Under the disclosure-dedication rule, anything disclosed in the patent specification that is not claimed
is per se dedicated to the public, and the patent owner cannot
use the doctrine of equivalents to recapture protection of that
122
subject matter. In Johnson & Johnston Associates v. R.E.
119. That is, in some instances, it will be presumed that any misrepresentation made before a tribunal will be relied upon by the tribunal. See, e.g.,
Monterey Dev. Corp. v. Lawyer’s Title Ins. Corp., 4 F.3d 605, 609 (8th Cir.
1993) (“Because the doctrine's focus is on the court's integrity, judicial estoppel
does not require proof of privity, reliance, or prejudice by the party invoking
it.”); cf. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001) (judicial estoppel requires court to accept party’s earlier position (i.e., rely upon it)).
120. Or, we could conclude that prosecution history estoppel is not “estoppel” at all. See Thomas, supra note 92, at 202 (“[E]ven a cursory examination
reveals that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is entirely misnamed.
An essential element of estoppel is reliance, a consideration that is wholly absent in the reported patent decisions.”).
121. For hints of this attitude, see Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust
Co., 311 U.S. 211, 221 (1940) (“The injurious consequences to the public and to
inventors and patent applicants if patentees were thus permitted to revive
cancelled or rejected claims and restore them to their patents are manifest.”);
Leggett v. Avery, 101 U.S. 256, 259–60 (1879) (noting “occasion of immense
frauds against the public” when formerly abandoned claims are revived).
122. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). For a general discussion of the use of the specification to limit equivalents, see Holbrook, supra note 76, at 139–44. The Federal
Circuit has also used the specification to narrow the availability of the doctrine of equivalents in circumstances that do not directly involve a disclosurededication issue, but may involve, for example, a specification that disparages
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Service Co., which involved printed circuit boards, the specification stated that “[w]hile aluminum is currently the preferred
material for the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel
123
or nickel alloys may be used.” However, the claims expressly
124
called for “a sheet of aluminum.” This was a clear instance of
disclosing subject matter (alternatives to aluminum) without
125
claiming it, according to the Federal Circuit. By looking to
the claim to define the scope of the right to exclude, and by
treating the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter as having
been dedicated to the public, the court asserted that it was up126
holding the public notice function of claims. Elaborating on
the meaning of the public notice function, the court declared
that the claims “give notice both to the examiner at the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution, and to the
public at large, including potential competitors, after the patent
127
has issued.”
It would seem easy enough to apply a complexity/proximity
calculus to the disclosure-dedication rule as enunciated in
Johnson & Johnston: this is a simple rule that therefore can
reasonably be directed to a diffuse and distant audience. But
this assessment is surely incorrect. The disclosure-dedication
rule is terrifically complex in application. To elicit what has
or otherwise surrenders an asserted equivalent. See, e.g., SciMed Life Sys.,
Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1380–
81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (failure to perform unclaimed but disclosed “back-up function” precludes equivalency). The application of these narrowing strategies in
the context of equivalents seems correlated to the court’s conclusions about
how to construe a particular claim. Generally, when the court narrows the literal scope of the claims pursuant to the specification in the course of claim
construction, the court also will find that the patentee is precluded from using
the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home
Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We have held that when a
specification excludes certain prior art alternatives from the literal scope of
the claims and criticizes those prior art alternatives, the patentee cannot then
use the doctrine of equivalents to capture those alternatives.”). But see
Holbrook, supra note 62, at 806 n.169 (criticizing this per se preclusion of the
doctrine of equivalents). The one exception to this rule has been when the asserted equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the application. See Abraxis
Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1376–78 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); see also Holbrook, supra note 27, at 26–27 (discussing the implications of Abraxis).
123. 285 F.3d at 1055.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1052.
127. Id.
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been dedicated, one must be able to determine what is claimed,
what is disclosed, and how the two correlate. As we have al128
ready discussed,
claim construction alone is a formidable
task, implicating proximity concerns, and the rules for determining what is disclosed in a patent specification are even
129
more complex.
The Federal Circuit’s case law applying the disclosurededication rule hints at these struggles. In PSC Computer
130
Products, Inc. v. Foxconn International, Inc., the claim at issue recited “an elongated, resilient metal strap,” one element in
a claimed retainer clip for a heat sink assembly used in making
131
semiconductors. The disclosure stated that “other resilient
materials may be suitable for the strap,” and it also stated that
“[o]ther prior art devices used molded plastic and/or metal
parts that must be cast or forged which again are more expen132
sive metal forming operations.” The disclosure-dedication issue was whether these statements dedicated the alternative
use of plastic parts to the public—or whether, indeed, they dedicated to the public everything except the use of “resilient met133
al.”
The court reverted to the PHOSITA heuristic in reformulating the disclosure-dedication rule:
We . . . hold that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand
the unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the alternative matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public. This “disclosure-dedication” rule does not mean that any generic
reference in a written specification necessarily dedicates all members
of that particular genus to the public. The disclosure must be of such
specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the sub134
ject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed.
128. See supra Part III.A.1 (regarding claim construction and the
PHOSITA as a constructed audience).
129. See infra Part III.A.4 (discussing disclosure doctrines from an audience perspective).
130. 355 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
131. Id. at 1355.
132. Id. at 1356.
133. Id. at 1357.
134. Id. at 1360. The court elaborated on the public notice function of the
patent document:
Suitable notice to the public, however, requires that the public understand the language of both the claims and the written description. We
have repeatedly explained that, in the absence of a compelling reason
to do otherwise, claims must be interpreted as one of ordinary skill in
the art would understand them . . . . It thus follows as a matter of
simple logic that, in the absence of a compelling reason to do otherwise, the written description must also be interpreted according to the
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The court then characterized the “other resilient materials”
statement in the specification as a “generic” reference that did
not give rise to dedication, but decided that the “[o]ther prior
art devices” statement was more specific and did result in dedi135
cation of plastic materials. We find this outcome defensible,
but the set of legal determinations entailed in reaching it are
not simple. As with claim construction rules, we are left wondering whether the summoning of the PHOSITA heuristic improves proximity enough to result in an acceptable complexity/proximity tradeoff.
The court’s decision in Toro Co. v. White Consolidated In136
dustries, Inc. amplifies our concerns. There, the court developed a customized rule, applicable only in the context of a disclosure-dedication issue, for determining what a patent
discloses, instead of relying on established statutory precepts
137
codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112. According to the court:
Thus, the level of disclosure needed to implicate the disclosurededication rule is different from the level of disclosure required under
§ 112 to support claims defining the scope of coverage of an invention.
Indeed, disclosures implicating the disclosure-dedication rule need
not directly relate to the description of the claimed invention or be
contained in the “Detailed Description of the Invention” section of the
patent, but may appear merely in the portion of the patent describing
138
the “Background of the Invention.”

Applying its rule, the court concluded that the patentee had
disclosed (but not claimed) a separate cover or ring structure

understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art.
Taken together, then, one of ordinary skill in the art should be
able to read a patent, to discern which matter is disclosed and discussed in the written description, and to recognize which matter has
been claimed . . . . The ability to discern both what has been disclosed
and what has been claimed is the essence of public notice. It tells the
public which products or processes would infringe the patent and
which would not.
Id. at 1359–60. The court may be commingling notions of the “public” with notions of the PHOSITA here, an analysis that we regard as unhelpful.
135. Id. at 1360.
136. 383 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
137. See id. at 1334.
138. Id.; see also Cent. Inst. for Experimental Animals v. Jackson Lab., 726
F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047–49 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding sufficient disclosure to
trigger rule). But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU
L. REV. 123, 167 (2006) (criticizing this outcome and advocating use of the 35
U.S.C. § 112 enablement inquiry to measure whether the disclosure is sufficient to trigger dedication).
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based on the fact that the specification included a comment
139
disparaging devices that used such a structure.
In view of the complexity of these rules, it strikes us as folly to suggest that all of this is an exercise in discerning what
the specification tells the “public at large” or even the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art. However, we are unsure
whether conjuring up a different heuristic is likely to advance
the law here. Instead, in this instance, the audience perspective
may expose a flaw in the central premise of the disclosurededication rule—that is, the premise that it is likely that readers of the patent document will identify information about unclaimed subject matter at such a level of specificity that the
reader could rely on that information to shape his or her own
commercial activities. Outside the simplest case involving discrete embodiments that are expressly disclosed but not
claimed, we think that this premise rests on unrealistic assumptions about the proximity between disclosure-dedication
legal principles and the general public audience. If the court
were to embrace our framework and reduce the rule’s complexity, the court could simply jettison the public dedication rule absent a clearly defined, alternative embodiment. The present
doctrine conflates with claim construction: third parties would
be mired in the confusion of assessing what the claim covers
and then determining whether the specification sufficiently
discloses an embodiment outside of the scope of the construed
claims. We believe this complexity is not worth the candle.
Alternatively, though less attractively, the court could attempt to speak to a more proximate audience, such as patent
attorneys and other sophisticates. Such an approach would require rejection of the PHOSITA construct and instead would focus on a more legally oriented perspective. Or the court could
expressly link the rule to the enablement doctrine: an alternative can only be dedicated to the public if it is enabled by the
140
patent but not claimed. Of course, such an approach presents
the issue of whether the enablement and other disclosure doctrines are appropriately constructed from an audience perspective, which we take up next.

139. Toro Co., 383 F.3d at 1334. It seems doubtful that such a disclosure
would have satisfied the requirements of 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 1.
140. One of us has previously advocated for this approach. See Holbrook,
supra note 138.
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4. Patent Disclosure Rules
In order to obtain a patent, an applicant must disclose her
invention in a manner sufficient to describe and allow others to
141
practice the invention without undue experimentation. The
disclosure obligations represent the “quid pro quo” of the patent
system: in order to obtain the exclusive rights of a patent, the
inventor must disclose her invention to the public in a manner
sufficient to allow others to practice the invention based on the
142
patent. By compelling disclosure, the patent system aspires
to carry out a teaching function: to inject information about the
workings of the invention into the general storehouse of
143
knowledge, thereby advancing innovation. Over time, the disclosure rules have also been called into service in other ways.
They have been invoked to provide assurance that the scope of
the patent rights correlates reasonably with the scope of the inventor’s contribution (as measured through the patent disclo144
sure). They also have been deployed for essentially eviden141. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”).
142. See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d
1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the court put it,
[t]he information in patents is added to the store of knowledge with
the publication/issuance of the patent. An important purpose of the
system of patents is to negate secrecy, and to provide otherwise unknown knowledge to the interested public . . . . In turn, the subject
matter of patents may be investigated and verified and elaborated;
the technological/scientific contribution to knowledge is not insulated
from analysis, study, and experimentation for the twenty years until
patent expiration. This quid pro quo is fundamental to patent systems. The statutory requirements of description, enablement, and
best mode, implement this policy, for these requirements facilitate
understanding and elaboration of the inventor's contribution.
Id.
143. Once the patent expires, the disclosure permits others to freely copy
the claimed invention. But even during the patent term, others can learn from,
improve upon, and design around the patented invention. Id. at 1072–73
(“Were such information prohibited from study until patent expiration, not only would the advance of science be slowed, but the design-around of patented
subject matter would be inhibited, if not excluded, if a new design could not be
derived from study of the old.”). Some commentators have called the quid pro
quo theory into doubt. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of
Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007
(2005).
144. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“‘The scope of the claims must be less
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tiary purposes, to corroborate (through the patent disclosure)
145
that the inventor completed the conception of the invention.
In striving to satisfy these multifarious ambitions, the
Federal Circuit has authored a convoluted jurisprudence of patent disclosure rules. The Federal Circuit has found three distinct disclosure requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph
146
1: written description, enablement, and best mode. While the
best mode requirement arguably has become a dead letter as a
147
result of legislative changes in the America Invents Act, distinguishing between the remaining two requirements—
enablement and written description—remains a matter of considerable difficulty, even though the issue was fully ventilated
148
by the Federal Circuit en banc. Even the staunchest proponents of separate enablement and written description requirements would surely concede that the jurisprudence is among
patent law’s most complex, and perhaps among the most resistant to simplification, despite an abundance of efforts, both

than or equal to the scope of the enablement’ to ‘ensure[] that the public
knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims.’”). For example, an inventor who finds a
vaccine for one particular type of RNA virus is not necessarily entitled to claim
a vaccine against all such viruses, such as HIV, because she has not demonstrated how to make or use such a broad genus of vaccines. See In re Wright,
999 F.2d 1557, 1562–64 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
145. See In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that
an affidavit under Rule 132 “establishes conception”).
146. See Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that, if one exists, the inventor must disclose the
best mode of practice); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336,
1344 –45 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding written description and enablement to be separate requirements).
147. With the enactment of the America Invents Act in September 2011,
the best mode requirement is no longer a basis for invalidating or rendering a
claim unenforceable. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–
29, § 15(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 35 U.S.C. § 282(3)) (amending 35
U.S.C. § 282 to state, “the failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis
on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise
unenforceable”). This amendment took effect “upon the date of the enactment
of this Act [September 16, 2011] and shall apply to proceedings commenced on
or after that date.” Id. at § 15(c).
148. We have given our views on these difficulties at great length elsewhere, and we are fairly certain that no one wants them repeated again here.
Those who do should consult Brief of Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 2–3 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008–1248), 2009 WL 3657814, (arguing that written description and enablement are not separate requirements
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1).
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judicial and academic, to more clearly elucidate the disclosure
rules.
Without intending to dismiss continuing efforts to reduce
149
rule complexity in the patent disclosure rules, courts might
instead devote more attention to offsetting that complexity by
making proximity more favorable. The law has made a start at
doing so, albeit rather a feeble one. The statute already provides that for purposes of the enablement requirement, the disclosure is to be assessed from the perspective of the PHOSITA,
150
not the general lay audience. Likewise, the Federal Circuit
has held that whether a patent disclosure complies with the
written description requirement is to be analyzed through the
151
eyes of the PHOSITA.
It is widely understood that the
PHOSITA heuristic is important here; assessing disclosures
from the perspective of the lay public would impose large costs
152
on patent applicants.

149. The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in more recent enablement cases evidences a worthwhile effort to reduce complexity. See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Andrx
Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“To satisfy the plain language of § 112, ¶ 1, ALZA was required to provide an adequate enabling disclosure in the specification; it cannot simply rely on the knowledge of a person
of ordinary skill to serve as a substitute for the missing information in the
specification.”); Auto. Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274,
1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Although the knowledge of one skilled in the art is indeed relevant, the novel aspect of an invention must be enabled in the patent.”).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (disclosure must be enabling from the perspective of “person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected”); see also In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 181 (C.C.P.A. 1960)
(“The descriptions in patents are not addressed to the public generally, to lawyers or to judges, but, as section 112 says, to those skilled in the art to which
the invention pertains or with which it is most nearly connected.”), overruled
on other grounds by In re Kirck, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The Federal
Circuit abides by this mandate. See Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
647 F.3d 1353, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part) (“The
relevant test for enablement is whether the specification enables one of skill in
the art to practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation.”).
151. See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (holding, for purposes of the written
description requirement, “the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of
the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that
the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing
date”).
152. If the law required that the general public be able to read the patent
and understand the invention based on little more than the patent document
alone, every patent document would need to be a textbook on elementary concepts in order to satisfy the disclosure requirements. The costs of preparing
patent applications would increase significantly under such rules. The administrative and private costs of reviewing patent documents might also rise in
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In our view, much more needs to be done given the high
degree of complexity. First, a far more robust incarnation of the
PHOSITA is needed. We see this occurring on a case-by-case
basis in some of the enablement cases, largely around debates
over what extent of experimentation on the part of the
153
PHOSITA should be deemed undue. However, we see virtually none of it in the written description jurisprudence.
Second, for reasons similar to those that we have discussed
154
above, the PHOSITA heuristic may simply be the wrong one
in cases where the disclosure doctrines are being invoked for
purposes of checking the scope of a patent. The disclosure doctrines in such cases are serving essentially as a fulcrum for a
legal judgment about claim scope. Such matters are, in the first
instance, directed to lawyers and other sophisticates who can
digest the complex doctrines surrounding the relationship between scope and disclosure. We have no simple solution for reformulating disclosure doctrines to account for this insight
about proximity. We can say that our observations about the
blended nature of disclosure doctrines—particularly the fact
that those doctrines are more heavily indebted to law than traditional accounts admit—align with those of other scholars who
have commented on the dichotomous nature of the disclosure
155
itself. Indeed, reliance on the rhetoric of the PHOSITA may
do little more than obscure the manner in which the court actually applies the disclosure doctrines.
Finally, the arguments that we have made apply with even
greater force in cases in which the disclosure doctrine at issue
is being used to corroborate that conception of the invention

view of the need for readers to sift through immense volumes of boilerplate
technical recitations.
153. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc. 687 F.3d
1377, 1380–84 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d
1371, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–40 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
154. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
155. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 119–24 (2009) (advocating actual reduction to practice
requirement); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosures, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539,
564 –94 (2009) (proposing that patent documents be “layered” with both legal
and technical portions to target specific audiences); Holbrook, supra note 62,
at 819–25 (advocating use of presumptions to balance technical and legal components of a patent’s disclosure); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641 (arguing for the inclusion of working examples in patent documents).
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156

was completed. It is a fallacy to suggest that by simply summoning up the PHOSITA and denominating the inquiry a ques157
tion of fact, the legal analysis approximates an objective, predictable inquiry driven mainly by technical facts. It is, instead,
an extraordinarily subtle legal judgment requiring application
of the rules of conception, folded into the disclosure rules. The
courts should acknowledge this problem when invoking the
written description requirement in such a context, and scholars
should develop alternative heuristics that move the inquiry
away from mere reliance on the PHOSITA.
5. Audience and Freedom-to-Operate: The Example of Divided
Infringement Claims
Assessing one’s exposure to patent infringement liability is
not an intuitive exercise, notwithstanding the patent law’s
standard rhetoric about the patent document supplying meaningful notice to the public. As the foregoing discussion highlights, it is difficult enough to analyze patent scope, which depends on an array of legal determinations that are not
necessarily evident from the face of the patent document. It is
then more difficult to analyze whether one’s activities would
fall within a patent’s properly-delineated scope. This latter
analysis, the infringement analysis, is nominally a question of
fact, but calls for the application of a number of legal principles
that few laypersons have absorbed.
This phenomenon—which triggers the need for members of
the public to consult with counsel to determine whether their
activities tread on the property rights of others—is certainly
not unique to patent law. Indeed, it is not news, and would
156. Typically, the written description requirement is the disclosure rule at
issue in such a case. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1367
n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In contrast to reduction to practice, conception is a prerequisite to an adequate written description.”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164,
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that “one cannot describe what one has not
conceived”).
157. Compare Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“‘A determination that a patent is invalid for failure
to meet the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 is a question
of fact, and we review a jury's determinations of facts relating to compliance
with the written description requirement for substantial evidence.’” (quoting
PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d, 1235, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2002))),
with Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1366 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[A] test
becomes no less subjective merely because it asks a fact finder to answer the
subjective question objectively. This court still asks the fact finder to imagine
what a person of skill in the art would have understood the inventor to have
subjectively possessed based on the description of the specification . . . .”).
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hardly be cause for comment, but for the emergence of an unfavorable trend in patent law, a trend towards injecting more
complexity into patent infringement determinations without
much attention to other doctrinal strategies that mitigate the
complexity.
The patent statute’s main infringement provision, 35
U.S.C. § 271(a), places considerable pressure on courts to develop a transparent jurisprudence on infringement. Section
271(a) is a strict liability provision, and it reaches virtually any
unauthorized act of exploitation of a claimed invention, including mere uses. For example, a consumer who carries out a routine task on a smartphone may well be using inventions
claimed in dozens of patents. If the smartphone manufacturer
has incorporated those inventions without a license, the consumer’s use, even if innocent, may well constitute an act of infringement. In terms of the analysis that we have set forth
here, this scenario is important because it presents a potential
proximity concern: the patent infringement rule binds a diffuse
audience of patent law outsiders. Accordingly, patent infringement rules that entail even moderate levels of complexity are
likely to stray from the preferred balance of complexity and
proximity in our calculus.
The controversy over so-called “divided” infringement illustrates the trend towards unmitigated complexity in modern pa158
tent infringement analysis. To understand the controversy, it
is helpful to understand the corollary debate over what constitutes an act of infringing “use” of a method invention, as contrasted with a system invention. Under the Federal Circuit’s
case law, in order for an actor to be liable for infringing use of a
method invention under § 271(a), the actor must (ordinarily)
159
carry out all of the steps of the claimed method. By contrast,
an actor can be liable under § 271(a) for infringing use of a system invention even if the actor does not control all of the elements of the system, as long as there exists some entity that
maintains control over the system as a whole and receives a
160
benefit when the system is used.
158. See generally Mark. A. Lemley, et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33
AIPLA Q.J. 255, 256–63 (2005).
159. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); BMC Inc. v. Paymentech, 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir 2007),
overruled on other grounds by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
No. 2009-1372, 2012 WL 3764695 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (per curiam).
160. See Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Comms. Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d
1279, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418

118

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:72

In a series of cases, many involving patents on Internetbased methods, the method claims were drafted in a way that
called for multiple actors each to participate in carrying out se161
lected steps of the method. Collectively, all of the steps were
performed, but no single actor performed all of them, presenting a question about whether any given actor could be deemed
to have engaged in an act of unauthorized use of the patented
method. To resolve the question, the court ruled that if one actor is the agent of another, or is contractually obligated to perform the steps of the method, then the court will treat the multiple actors as a single entity for purposes of discerning an act
162
of infringing use. In theory, such a rule again highlights the
proximity problem, because the Internet-using general public is
typically one of the multiple actors whose activities are at issue
in these cases.
The Federal Circuit appeared to be set to reevaluate the
wisdom of the single-actor rule for method claims (and derogations from that rule) in two co-pending en banc cases, Akamai
163
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. and McKesson
164
Technologies Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp. Members of the patent community expected the court to address the single-entity
rule, and perhaps eliminate the bifurcated state of the law with
respect to methods and systems. It also was an occasion for the
court to revisit these doctrines with an eye on the relevant auF.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court in NTP adopted this rule to determine the locus of infringement for a system that straddled the United States
and Canadian border; the court extended this rule for wholly domestic infringement in Centillion. See Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284. For criticisms of
both the bifurcation of methods and systems claims and of the “control and
beneficial use test,” see Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent
Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2153, 2158–59 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he
bifurcated approach to explaining the ‘use’ of an invention belies the clear
statutory structure. There is no reason that ‘use’ of a method should be viewed
as different from the ‘use’ of a system” and criticizing the “control and beneficial test” as “fatally ambiguous”).
161. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 632 F.3d 1292, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311, 1318–
22 (Fed. Circ. 2010), rev’d and remanded, No. 2009–1372, 2012 WL 3764695
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (en banc); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532
F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Inc. v. Paymentech, 498 F.3d 1373,
1378 (Fed. Cir 2007), overruled on other grounds by Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., No. 2009–1372, 2012 WL 3764695 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
31, 2012) (per curiam).
162. Akamai, 629 F.3d at 1318–22.
163. 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), vacated, 419 Fed. Appx. 989 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
164. Akamai, 2012 WL 3764695.
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dience. Instead, the court side-stepped the single-entity issue.
The court retained the “agency or contractual” obligation test
for direct infringement of patented methods and did not alter
the “control or beneficial use” test for infringement of systems.
Instead, it redefined active inducement of infringement under
165
35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Now, “[i]f a party has knowingly induced
others to commit the acts necessary to infringe the plaintiff's
patent and those others commit those acts, there is no reason to
immunize the inducer from liability for indirect infringement
simply because the parties have structured their conduct so
that no single defendant has committed all the acts necessary
166
to give rise to liability for direct infringement.”
Under our calculus, the Akamai/McKesson result is a
mixed blessing. By shifting the analysis to § 271(b) inducement,
the court reduced the scope of the potential affected audience,
because § 271(b) liability extends only to those who have
knowledge of the patent and an intent to induce acts of infringement. As such, the only parties that are liable for inducing such infringement are those that have actively engaged in
the patent system and have awareness of the patent and a be167
lief that the activity they are inducing is infringing. Such actors must be quite familiar with the patent system and law to
form such an intent. They are not terribly remote from the
courts; the court therefore made the law here more proximate
to it. The use of active inducement, therefore, is a gain in proximity, in our terms. As a practical matter, the gain may be con165. Id. at *3–4. There may be some unintended consequences to the
court’s redefinition of induced infringement. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of Akamai, EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2154277 (noting that, because § 271(b) has no territorial limits, the court may
have expanded the reach of patents over methods that straddle national borders).
166. Akamai, 2012 WL 3764695, at *4.
167. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011)
(holding “that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that
the induced acts constitute patent infringement”); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS
Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part)
(required to induce infringement, as opposed to induce the acts constituting
infringement, for liability under § 271(b)). Of course, the lack of the requisite
intent and knowledge would seemingly only preclude damages; such inducers
could still be subject to an injunction of they continue activity after the suit is
filed. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement,
22 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 407 (2006); Jason A.
Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 1575, 1603 n.162 (2011).
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siderable, if, as we suspect, many future cases of this type will
be framed as inducement cases.
On the other hand, the court’s approach leaves intact the
complexity associated with the agency/contractual obligation
test for § 271(a) infringement of method claims, and the control/beneficial use test for § 271(a) infringement of system
claims, and does nothing to improve proximity. This bifurcated
approach does little to afford better notice to the public. It assumes that the public would be aware not only of the dichotomous case law but also of whether the claims in a particular
patent cover a method or system. Thus, courts could reconsider
the entirety of this doctrine with a focus on enhancing proximity through the use of heuristic. In other words, the courts may
want to address the issue of divided infringement from the perspective of an intermediary. Our ubiquitous intermediary, the
PHOSITA, would not seem appropriate as “single-entity” doctrine and “control and beneficial use” test are not tied to technological know-how. The use of a “reasonable patent attorney
or litigator” would also be ill-fitting because these doctrines do
not have their genesis in patent law but instead are creatures
of tort law. Under the current law, even patent law sophisticates may struggle to understand the nuances involved in assessing whether these standards have been met, though one
would expect that such sophisticates would come to learn more
about the application of agency principles over time.
In sum, our proximity/complexity matrix is useful here as a
new way to frame the divided infringement problem. It may also be useful as a design tool to the extent that it focuses decision-makers on the benefits of achieving more favorable proximity.
B. PROXIMITY AND EX ANTE INCENTIVES IN PATENTABILITY
DOCTRINES
The complexity/proximity tradeoff also has implications for
the formulation of patentability doctrines. We focus here on the
statutory bars to patentability—rules that bar patent protection for inventions that have been the subject of certain disclosures or sales occurring before the application filing date. There
are three reasons for choosing the statutory bars. First, the
statutory bars have traditionally been of immense practical
significance in patentability assessments, both in ex parte
prosecution and in assessments of validity after patent issuance. Second, they are tied closely to the ex ante incentives that
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the patent system purports to provide. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, the patentability rules (of which the statutory bar
provisions are a subset) have just undergone the most comprehensive structural reform in the history of the U.S. patent sys168
tem. This reform has eliminated the invention-date provisions and has reformulated and restated the statutory bar
169
provisions. Courts will soon begin conforming the existing patentability case law to these amended provisions. This is a
unique opportunity for the Federal Circuit to reexamine and refine its statutory bar jurisprudence. The audience analysis—
and particularly its insistence on consciously accounting for the
complexity/proximity tradeoff—offers one framework for carrying out this exercise, as we discuss.
1. The On-Sale Bar to Patentability
Inventors can only receive a patent if their inventions are
novel and nonobvious relative to what is already known, re170
ferred to in patent parlance as the prior art. Under the 1952
Patent Act, patentability over the prior art is assessed as of the
171
date of invention, with a crucial exception: a patent is barred
if, more than one year before the application filing date, the invention was patented, disclosed in a printed publication, on
172
sale, or in public use. Under the America Invents Act (AIA),

168. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29,
125 Stat. 328 (2011) (providing for patent reform).
169. These changes convert the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent
system into a first-to-file system. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the
America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 22–
24 (2012).
170. See id. at 11 (“This new, transparent definition for what qualifies as
‘prior art,’ which is then used to determine novelty and non-obviousness of a
claimed invention, sits alongside the three remaining core legal issues of patent validity.”).
171. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless
. . . the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.”); Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79
F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Any suggestion that a document is prior art
because it appears before the filing date of a patent ignores the requirements
of section 102(a). Section 102(a) explicitly refers to invention dates, not filing
dates. Thus, under section 102(a), a document is prior art only when published
before the invention date.”).
172. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless
. . . the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.”).
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patentability is no longer assessed as of the invention date, but
173
rather, the filing date of the patent.
The statutory bar rules—whether in their 1952 or 2011 incarnations—are presumed to be closely tied to the ex ante incentives that the patent grant purports to provide. To invoke
but one familiar example, the ex ante “incentive to invent” theory of patent law suggests that the promise of patent protection
will induce would-be innovators to engage in the inventive enterprise because they know they will be able to recoup their
sunk, fixed research and development (R&D) costs over the lifetime of the patent by exploiting the patent’s exclusionary pow174
er. However, where the information embodied in an invention
is already accessible to the public, or is already the subject of
commercial dealings, the social welfare losses from a patent
grant would exceed the gains, and, in theory, the patent system
should not encourage investments in such inventive activity.
Thus, the statutory bar rules play a crucial role in shaping the
patent incentive to serve the patent system’s instrumental
goals.
An operative assumption—too frequently overlooked—is
that the statutory bar rules actually communicate these incentives effectively, meaning that they communicate to the audience of relevant decision-makers, at a point in time to affect a
decision whether to invest effort and resources in invention. In
at least some settings, and perhaps many settings, this is pure
fantasy. The rules purport to speak to an audience that encompasses anyone who might become an innovator, before they
have committed resources to developing an innovation. Moreover, at least under the incentive-to-invent theory, the pertinent
173. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(b)(1) (amending 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) effective March 16, 2013) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless: (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, other otherwise available to the public before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .”). Under the AIA, a significant change is that third party sales and uses are not subject to the one-year
grace period and automatically render the patent unpatentable. Id.
174. See Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1855, 1892 (2012) (“The incentive-to-invent theory is the classic justification for the patent system. Under this theory, patent law incentivizes the
creation of inventions by giving the inventor a mechanism by which she can
recoup her development costs: exclusivity. The incentive to-invent theory assumes the exclusive rights to the invention allow the inventor to price the invention more like a monopolist, thus above marginal cost. The potential for
this additional revenue is what entices a would-be inventor to try to invent.”).
See generally Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1024 –28.
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incentives purport to operate before the inventor even undertakes the inventive activity, and presumably long before the inventor actually consults with a patent attorney or other sophisticated intermediary who can translate raw patent law rules
into particularized action items guiding prospective R&D activity. In addition, the patent system cannot necessarily rely upon
social norms as mechanism for conveying the requisite incen175
tives message. Absent special circumstances, it is not clear
that relevant social norms exist, or are embedded to an extent
176
comparable to other areas of law. As the Lough case demonstrates, inventors of reasonable intelligence, operating in apparent good faith may be utterly unaware of the arcane rules
that govern whether an inventor is entitled to patent protec177
tion. This is surely one of patent law’s most severe proximity
problems. The need for robust bridging heuristics, and/or for
restraint against rule complexity, is paramount.
The law as currently formulated falls far short, indulging
in some refinements in the name of enhancing “certainty” but
ignoring the proximity problem. Consider, for example, the onsale bar case law. The Supreme Court, addressing the legal
standard for when an invention should be considered “on sale”
under § 102(b) of the 1952 Act, discarded the Federal Circuit’s
“totality of the circumstances” test as insufficiently certain, and
instead substituted a two-part standard: an invention is “on
sale” if the product is (1) “the subject of a commercial offer for
178
sale,” and (2) of subject matter that is “ready for patenting.”
The Court left no doubt that it expected inventors to be capable
of decoding this rule, noting that “[a]n inventor can both under175. These circumstances could include an experienced inventor drawing
on past experience (such as past consultations with patent lawyers), or a corporate R&D group drawing upon general norms embedded in corporate culture
through periodic educational efforts undertaken by in-house counsel.
176. For example, contrast intellectual property law with criminal law.
Many aspects of the criminal law may be considered to coincide roughly with
social norms, so there is a level of compliance among the general population
that arises even absent actual awareness or decoding of the formal law. See
Jeanne M. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 25) (on file with authors) (“This view
of the harmonious interaction on law and norms has important implications
for intellectual property laws with regard to incentive design. Just as criminal
law can obtain deterrence by imposing retributive punishments that communally shame offenders, so too can intellectual property laws provide utilitarian
incentives to create sounding in moral rights.”).
177. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Plager, J., dissenting).
178. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998).
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stand and control the timing of the first commercial marketing
179
of his invention.”
We see many reasons to doubt that the result is a favorable
tradeoff of complexity and proximity. The first prong of the test
is more complex than courts have acknowledged. Under the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation, the first prong is met only
when the commercial activity would constitute a formal offer to
180
sell under contract law. The Federal Circuit justified this
gloss on the Supreme Court’s language on the basis of certain181
ty, but we believe that we could identify many first-year law
students who could confirm that determining what constitutes
a contract offer is not necessarily an exercise in simple intui182
tion. More importantly, such a rule is directed to lawyers (or
other similarly proximate intermediaries). Few technologists
would understand the complex inquiries that would be needed
to assess whether certain commercial activity constitutes a
formal offer to sell, as opposed to mere “invitations” for offers or
even offers to buy the invention. Of course, one might argue
183
that many patent applicants are corporate inventors whose
employers may be repeat players with sophisticated legal staffs
that help translate patentability rules to them. But others are
179. Id. at 67. It seems highly likely the courts will adopt this same definition for the on-sale activity under the America Invents Act (AIA), given that
the statute uses identical language to the 1952 Act. For a discussion of the relationship between the on-sale bar under the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA, see
Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility after Transocean, 61
EMORY L.J. 1087, 1112 (2012).
180. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254 –55
(Fed. Cir. 2000). See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat
of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and
Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 764–84 (2003) (discussing and criticizing
the formal commercial offer standard on audience grounds).
181. Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“Applying established concepts of contract law, rather than some more
amorphous test, implements the broad goal of Pfaff, which, in replacing this
court’s ‘totality of the circumstances’ test with more precise requirements, was
to bring greater certainty to the analysis of the on-sale bar.”).
182. See generally Lucas S. Osborne, ‘Offers to Sell’ as a Policy Tool, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026941 (deconstructing the meaning of the
traditional contract-law “offer”).
183. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An
Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101
(2000) (finding more than 80% of patents are assigned to companies). Nevertheless, 20% of patents are not, meaning that there is a substantial number of
inventors operating without necessarily ready access to patent attorneys during the inventive process.
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not, and, as the Lough case illustrates, they are equally bound
184
by the rules. Moreover, by framing the first prong in a man185
ner that could only be comprehensible to sophisticates, the
Federal Circuit’s approach is in tension with the Supreme
Court’s apparent preference for fashioning a rule for the inven186
tor community.
The second prong of the on-sale bar test also highlights the
problem with the on-sale bar in terms of the complexity/proximity tradeoff. The Supreme Court noted that, to trigger
187
the on-sale bar, the invention must be “ready for patenting.”
An invention is “ready for patenting” when the inventor has either built a working embodiment (a reduction to practice) or
prepared diagrams or descriptions sufficient to enable a person
188
of ordinary skill to make the invention. Generally, the decision of whether an invention is complete enough to warrant a
patent application is assessed by a patent attorney. This is
quite similar to the proximity problem that we identified in
previous sections where a rule depends upon construction of
189
the patent specification.
Our audience analysis, then, places the complexity and
proximity problems with the on-sale bar into sharper focus. It
does not point ineluctably to a quick solution to those problems.
Regarding the proximity problem, we are skeptical that simply
integrating the PHOSITA more fully into the on-sale bar test
will bring the test more in line with its apparent aspiration of
communicating directly to would-be inventors. Such a move
might improve the transparency of the second prong, but would
do little or nothing for the first. As for the complexity problem,
we regard the Court’s two-pronged test as having reduced com190
plexity only marginally, but we are not prepared here to pro184. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Plager, J. dissenting).
185. The Federal Circuit’s interest in certainty is addressed to the courts,
not necessarily to actors in the patent system. See Grp. One, 254 F.3d at 1047
(“Courts are quite accustomed to and comfortable with determining whether a
particular communication or series of communications amounts to an offer in
the contract sense.” (emphasis added)).
186. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
187. Id. at 67–68.
188. Id.
189. See supra Section III.A (discussing the proximity/complexity problem
with patent scope doctrines).
190. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They
Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest
for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 960 (2000)
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pose a better alternative. Our instinct is that on-sale bar jurisprudence is in need of concurrent efforts to continue to reduce
complexity (perhaps by articulating and experimenting with
inventor safe harbors, for example) while also addressing the
proximity problem through the use of the PHOSITA or other
means.
2. The Public-Use Bar to Patentability and the ExperimentalUse Negation
The jurisprudence of the public-use bar of § 102(b) of the
1952 Patent Act (which is likely to be taken up, in large part,
for purposes of analyzing the use bar of § 102(a) of the AIA),
likewise does not hold up well when analyzed in terms of the
complexity/proximity tradeoff. Unlike the on-sale bar, which
frequently presents hard questions about whether the subject
191
matter at issue was ready for patenting, the public-use bar
typically revolves around questions about whether the use at
issue should be deemed public. In some cases, this question can
be resolved intuitively based on common sense indicia of public
accessibility, such as whether the use was undertaken in a public place, or whether the use was visible to the public. However,
in other cases, including some early, now-famous cases, courts
declared uses to be public based primarily on policy assessments rather than any accessibility calculus. For example, in
Egbert, the Court found a use public because it considered the
inventor to have relinquished control over a prototype of the
invention, behavior that the Court apparently sought to discourage quite independently of whether the prototypes were
192
likely to have been viewed by the public. In another famous
case, Judge Learned Hand found a patented method to be in
(“The myriad of factual circumstances identified by the courts belies the predictability and the certainty that the Supreme Court had hoped would emerge
from its new test. Indeed the facts relevant under the ‘ready for patenting’ test
are very similar to those under the ‘substantially complete’ test.”).
191. Only rarely have the courts even explicitly recited a “ready for patenting” element of the public-use test. But see Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg.,
L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring that the use be public
and that the subject matter be ready for patenting).
192. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337–38 (1881) (holding that use of
invention in undergarments, never exposed to the general public, constitutes
invalidating public use); see also id. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“If the little
steel spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by only one woman,
covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld from public
observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the
line between a private and a public use.”).
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public use by an inventor even when it was kept secret because
193
the inventor had commercialized the product of that process.
Thus, the inquiry of whether use is “public” is potentially
complex, and this is problematic because, like the on-sale bar,
the public-use bar purports to influence directly the investment
decisions of would-be innovators. In fact, our discussion to this
point understates the complexity/proximity problem, because
we have not accounted for the experimental-use doctrine, the
doctrine that was at issue in Lough. Under current case law, if
the use was directed primarily to experimental activity, then
194
the public-use bar is not triggered. The Supreme Court, in
City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., noted
that “[t]he use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any
other person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in
order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been re195
garded as such a [public] use.”
Perhaps no other doctrine in patent law presents a more
intractable complexity/proximity problem than does the experimental-use negation of the on-sale and public-use bars. While
the policies underlying the experimental-use negation are
196
probably intuitive even for non-lawyers, the law that implements those policies has become exceptionally difficult to parse.
The Federal Circuit has advocated the use of thirteen nonexclusive factors for assessing whether a particular use or sale
197
is experimental in nature. Even patent sophisticates would
193. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946).
194. See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (discussing experimental-use negation in the public-use bar context).
The experimental nature of an inventor’s activity could also negate what
would otherwise constitute an on-sale bar. See, e.g., Electromotive Div. of Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1211–12
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that experimental use in the on-sale bar context negates the commerciality of the offer).
195. 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877).
196. The experimental use exception to the statutory bars is designed to
afford the inventor time to finalize the invention even in circumstances where
the inventor might derive some incidental benefit from the use and where others may be aware of the invention. See, e.g., id. at 135. Without the experimental use safety valve, inventors theoretically would have to race to the
USPTO to file applications on inventions that are not fully developed and not
amenable to being disclosed adequately to satisfy the obligations of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2006).
197. EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Linn, J., concurring). The court identified the following thirteen factors:
(1) the necessity for public testing; (2) the amount of control over the experi-
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have difficulty predicting whether a particular use would qualify as “experimental,” let alone a technologist unfamiliar with
patent doctrine. Judge Lourie’s characterization of the publicuse analysis confirms that this doctrine is far up on the complexity axis:
With respect to both public use and experimental use, courts have
been accustomed to referring to their determinations as involving “the
totality of circumstances,” a phrase that some have objected to as being indefinite. What this phrase conveys is simply the process by
which judges decide legal issues based on various facts that have been
determined, utilizing the tools that judges always use, viz., the language of the statute, the purposes of the statute as indicated by legislative history, etc. Cases depend on facts, but they involve legal judg198
ments.

The Lough case epitomizes the disconnect between the
complexity of the law and the distant audience of inventors. As
Judge Plager explained in his dissent in Lough:
Of course it would have been better for all . . . if Mr. Lough had
read our prior opinions before he became an inventor. Then he might
have kept detailed lab notes setting out the problem and the possible
solutions, and he wisely would have obtained written confidentiality
agreements from those allowed to see or use his prototypes. Had he
studied our cases first, he no doubt would have developed a detailed
questionnaire for the persons to whom he provided the seals, and he
would have insisted on periodic written reports . . . . Instead, he did
what seemed appropriate in the setting in which he worked: he waited to hear from his test cases what problems might emerge, and,
hearing none, at least none that convinced him he was on the wrong
track, he accepted some friendly advice and proceeded to patent his
invention . . . . Yes, he failed to conduct his testing, his experiments,
with the careful attention we lawyers, with our clean and dry hands,
199
have come to prefer.

To us, Lough’s acts are quite plausibly experimental, especially if viewed from the perspective of an inventor who is unaware of the complexities of patent law. Indeed, the jury also
ment retained by the inventor; (3) the nature of the invention; (4) the length of
the test period; (5) whether payment was made; (6) whether there was a secrecy obligation; (7) whether records of the experiment were kept; (8) who conducted the experiment; (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during testing; (10) whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation under actual
conditions of use; (11) whether testing was systematically performed; (12)
whether the inventor continually monitored the invention during testing; and
(13) the nature of contacts made with potential customers. Id.; accord Allen
Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reciting thirteen factors).
198. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Lourie, J., concurring in order declining suggestion for rehearing en banc).
199. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1124 (Plager, J., dissenting).
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200

thought that his acts were reasonable. Yet, the court, as a legal matter, refused to find Lough’s activities to be sufficient for
experimentation. Indeed, Judge Lourie dismissed the audience
concern, noting “[t]he fact that members of the public may not
know for certain what a judge or panel of judges may decide on
a particular matter is hardly a criticism of the system of assign201
ing fact-law labels to issues for decision.” We advocate just
the opposite approach: consideration of the appropriate audience is crucial to designing an efficiently operating patent system, particularly if we expect members of the community to respond to the incentives it purports to provide.
In its more recent efforts to deal with the experimental-use
negation, the Federal Circuit has appeared to lock on to concerns about doctrinal complexity. For example, notwithstanding its fealty to the thirteen-factor test, the court has elevated
two factors, control and customer awareness, as being more
equal than the others, designating them as necessary condi202
tions for experimental use. If an inventor has not exercised
sufficient control and the customer is not aware of the experimental nature of the use, then there can be no experimentaluse negation, according to this rendition of the doctrine. The
presence of control and awareness permit a finding of experimental use, though the fact finder would need to consider the
other factors as well; control and awareness, therefore are necessary though perhaps not sufficient conditions.
The court’s move to reduce complexity is laudable in principle, but we have many reservations about it. First, we are dubious about its durability. That these factors are necessary but
not alone sufficient suggests that courts will draw upon other
factors perhaps to trump any finding of experimental use. The
200. Id. at 1118 (“A jury found that Brunswick failed to prove that Lough’s
invention was in public use before the critical date.”); see also Lough, 103 F.3d
at 1522–23 (Newman, J., dissenting from order declining suggestion for rehearing en banc) (reciting facts and inferences supporting the jury’s verdict).
201. Lough, 103 F.3d at 1519 (Lourie, J., concurring in declination of en
banc review).
202. See Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of
Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1214 –15 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Lough, 103
F.3d at 1526 (Michel, J., dissenting from order declining suggestion for rehearing en banc) (“I would take the case in banc to reaffirm our classification of
public use as ultimately an issue of law and also to identify certain indicia of
‘control,’ e.g., record keeping, secrecy agreements, testing protocols, supervision of testing, reports to the inventor or restricted access to others, proof of
which should be required before any potentially barring use in public can, on
grounds of experimentation, avoid the public use bar.”).
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likely reason for so many factors is that there is an underlying
equitable impulse that has driven judicial decisions in this area. We do not believe that merely elevating two factors will remove that impulse. Moreover, and more troubling, we are not
so sanguine that these two factors are actually more important
than the others. As to control, there may be circumstances,
such in the Lough case, where formal control may be lacking
but informal, social norms may suggest that there was in fact
experimentation. As to customer awareness, it remains unclear
to us why this factor has been elevated at all. If the experimental-use doctrine is in essence gauging the level of development of the invention, then subjective awareness of the customer seems too peripheral. Additionally, it could very well be
that there is not a customer, at least in the public-use context.
Thus, customer awareness may have some bearing in negating
the on-sale bar (where there is at least a proposed transaction
between two parties); it would appear to have far less relevance
in the context of the public-use bar.
Although the court has attempted to make the law less
complex, we are not convinced that this move will suffice given
the remoteness of the audience of inventors. We would prefer to
see the court focus more of its attention on addressing proximity. The court might begin by dispensing with the fiction that
the experimental-negation rules as they currently exist are
comprehensible to inventors themselves, or that those rules directly shape ex ante incentives in any direct way. This, in turn,
would make plain the need to develop better heuristics or other
strategies for rendering proximity more favorable.
Overall, unlike the ex post considerations of patent scope,
the statutory bars need to be accessible to a wide spectrum of
inventors if the incentives of the regime are to operate appropriately. While we recognize that the community of innovators
may need to tolerate a certain level of complexity in statutory
bar rules, we expect that it will be difficult to refine these rules
by addressing proximity alone. The public-use bar and the experimental-use negation, while focused on questions of historical fact, might be clarified and simplified in a manner to pro203
vide reduce complexity for the relevant audience, even while
courts simultaneously strive to address the proximity issue.
203. Cf. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 22–
25 (2011) (arguing that lay persons will use heuristics and seek out expert
opinions, rather than choose to “wrestle with understanding a complex technology”).
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CONCLUSION
Our goal in this Article is not to propose any monolithic
definition of patent law’s audience. Instead, our goal is to point
out the disconnect between patent law’s presumptuous rhetoric
about its audience and the reality of the patent system’s institutions and communications challenges. Our further goal is to
consider approaches to designing patent law doctrines that
take into account the disconnect and the challenges.
One design approach requires that those who craft patent
doctrine first discard the fallacy that patent law rules are addressed to the general public (or even to inventors), and recognize that virtually all patent law rules are broadcast to and
among multiple intermediaries that retransmit (and frequently
reformulate) those rules for consumption by generalists. The
roles played by these intermediaries, and their place in the design calculus for patent law rules, have not been articulated
sufficiently. Intermediaries might impede communication or
foster it. They might represent actual persons or institutions,
or they might constitute convenient fabrications, such as the
PHOSITA, the “reasonable competitor,” or the “reasonable patent attorney” heuristics. Regarding the heuristics, a patent law
jurisprudence that is attuned to patent law’s audience (and the
complexity/proximity tradeoff) ought to treat the development
of the PHOSITA and other heuristics as a central design task
rather than as an afterthought. It should invoke and shape
these heuristics much more deliberately. It should also recognize that, for some patent rules, the PHOSITA heuristic alone
may be insufficient to improve proximity between the lawmaker and the ultimate audience.
Ultimately, if the patent law is to operationalize its oftstated concerns with providing “public notice,” or with shaping
incentives for communities of would-be innovators, then patent
rules must be designed with an eye to communicating with these audiences. A sole focus on reducing rule complexity, taking
no account of the rule’s proximity to its putative audience, is
not likely to be productive.

